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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse comporte trois essais en macroéconomie en économie ouverte et commerce interna-
tional. Je considère tour à tour les questions suivantes : sous quelles conditions est-il optimal pour
un pays de former une union économique ? (essai 1) ; l’augmentation de la dispersion transversale
des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays est-elle compatible avec une dispersion relativement stable des
taux d’investissement ? (essai 2) ; le risque de perte de marché à l’exportation du fait de l’existence
des zones de commerce préférentiel joue t-il un rôle dans la décision des pays exclus de négocier
des accords commerciaux à leur tour ? (essai 3).
Le premier essai examine les conditions d’optimalité d’une union économique. Il s’intéresse à
une motivation particulière : le partage du risque lié aux fluctuations du revenu. Dans la situation
initiale, les pays ont très peu d’opportunités pour partager le risque à cause des frictions : les mar-
chés financiers internationaux sont incomplets et il n’y pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les
contrats de crédit entre pays. Dans ce contexte, une union économique apparait comme un arran-
gement qui pallie à ces frictions entre les pays membres seulement. Cependant, l’union dans son
ensemble continue de faire face à ces frictions lorsqu’elle échange avec le reste du monde. L’ar-
bitrage clé dans le modèle est le suivant. D’un coté, l’intégration économique permet un meilleur
partage du risque entre pays membres et la possibilité pour le partenaire pauvre d’utiliser la ligne
de crédit du partenaire riche en cas de besoin. De l’autre coté, l’union peut faire face à une limite
de crédit plus restrictive parce que résilier la dette extérieure est moins coûteux pour les membres
l’union. De plus, le fait que le partenaire pauvre peut utiliser la limite de crédit du partenaire riche
génère une externalité négative pour ce dernier qui se retrouve plus fréquemment contraint au ni-
veau des marchés internationaux des capitaux. En conformité avec les faits observés sur l’intégra-
tion économique, le modèle prédit que les unions économiques sont relativement peu fréquentes,
sont plus susceptibles d’être créées parmi des pays homogènes, et généralement riches.
Le deuxième essai porte sur la dispersion des avoirs extérieurs nets et la relation avec la dis-
persion des taux d’investissement. Au cours des récentes décennies, la dispersion croissante des
déséquilibres extérieurs et les niveaux record atteints par certaines grandes économies ont reçu
une attention considérable. On pourrait attribuer ce phénomène à une réduction des barrières aux
mouvements internationaux des capitaux. Mais dans ce cas, il est légitime de s’attendre à une aug-
iv
mentation de la dispersion au niveau des taux d’investissement ; ceci, parce que le financement
des besoins en investissements constitue une raison fondamentale pour laquelle les pays échangent
les capitaux. Les données indiquent cependant que la dispersion des taux d’investissement est res-
tée relativement stable au cours des récentes décennies. Pour réconcilier ces faits, je construis un
modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique où les pays sont hétérogènes en raison des
chocs idiosyncratiques à leurs niveaux de productivité totale des facteurs. Au niveau des marchés
internationaux des capitaux, le menu des actifs disponibles est restreint à une obligation sans risque
et il n’y a pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. A tout moment,
un pays peut choisir de résilier sa dette extérieure sous peine d’exclusion financière et d’un coût
direct. Ce coût direct reflète les canaux autres que l’exclusion financière à travers lesquels les pays
en défaut sont pénalisés. Lorsque le modèle est calibré pour reproduire l’évolution de la dispersion
transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets, il produit une dispersion relativement stable des taux d’in-
vestissement. La raison principale est que les incitations que les pays ont à investir sont liées à la
productivité. Avec l’intégration financière, même si les opportunités d’emprunt se sont multipliées,
les incitations à investir n’ont pas beaucoup changé. Ce qui permet de générer une dispersion ac-
crue de la position des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays avec une dispersion relativement stable des
taux d’investissement.
Le troisième essai analyse un aspect de l’interdépendance dans la formation des accords com-
merciaux préférentiels : j’examine empiriquement si le risque de diversion des exportations en
faveur des pays membres des zones de commerce préférentiel est un facteur déterminant dans la
décision des pays exclus de ces accords de négocier un accord à leur tour. Je construis un indicateur
qui mesure le potentiel de diversion des exportations auquel font face les pays et estime un modèle
probit de formation des zones de commerce préférentiel créées entre 1961 et 2005. Les résultats
confirment que les pays confrontés à un plus grand potentiel de détournement des échanges sont
plus susceptibles de former une zone de commerce préférentiel à leur tour.
Mots-clés : Marchés incomplets, Contraintes de crédit endogènes, Partage du risque, Intégra-
tion économique, Avoirs extérieurs nets, Investissement, Accords commerciaux préférentiels,
Diversion commerciale, Modèle probit.
ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays in open economic macroeconomics and international trade. I
consider the following questions: Which countries find it individually optimal to form an economic
union? (essay 1); is the rising cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions consistent
with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates? (essay 2); is the risk of trade diversion due
to existing preferential trade areas an important factor in excluded countries decision to seek one?
(essay 3).
The first essay studies the individual optimality of economic integration. It emphasizes the
risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. In an initial situation, countries have very limited
possibilities to share idiosyncratic endowment risk because of financial frictions: international fi-
nancial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union is an arrangement that
solves both the market incompleteness and the lack of enforcement problems among member
countries. The union as a whole still faces these frictions when trading in the world economy.
The model emphasizes the following key trade-off. There are two benefits from economic inte-
gration: better risk-sharing among member countries and the possibility for poor partners to use
the rich partners’ credit lines. The cost are the following: borrowing limits become tighter be-
cause defaulting on international debt becomes less costly for union partners. Since poor partners
may benefit from the rich partner’s credit limit, this generates a negative externality: rich partners
will find themselves more often borrowing-constrained in a union compared to standing alone in
the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, the model predicts that
economic unions occur relatively infrequently and are more likely to emerge among homogeneous
and rich countries.
The rising dispersion of external imbalances over the recent decades and the record-high levels
reached by some major economies has received considerable attention during the recent years. The
second essay focuses on one of such imbalances: the net foreign asset positions (NFA). One can
view this rising dispersion as a consequence of the reduction in barriers to capital flows. But in such
case, one would expect the dispersion in investment rates to go up as well because one fundamental
reason countries borrow and lend internationally is to finance their investments needs. Instead, the
dispersion in investment rates was relatively stable. To explain this puzzling fact, I undertake a
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quantitative analysis of the global dispersion of net foreign asset positions and investment rates.
The framework is an integrated model of world economy where countries differences arise from
idiosyncratic shocks to their total factor productivity levels. International capital flows is restricted:
the menu of assets traded is exogenously restricted to a risk-free bond, and international lending
contracts are not legally enforceable. At any time, a country may choose to repudiate its foreign
debt subject to financial exclusion and an output cost. The output cost captures margins other
than financial exclusion through which defaulting countries can be punished. When calibrated
to match the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion in net foreign asset positions, the model
produces a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. The reason is because the incentives
to invest are related to the productivity, not to the borrowing and lending opportunities. Although
the opportunities to borrow and lend internationally have increased, the incentives to invest have
not changed much, thereby generating a large cross-sectional dispersion in NFA positions with a
relatively stable dispersion in investment rates.
The third essay investigates empirically whether the risk of trade diversion faced by countries
excluded from preferential trade areas (PTA) is determinant in their decision to seek a preferential
trade agreement. Using the trade complementarity index, I derive a measure of the potential of
trade diversion and estimate a probit model of the formation of PTAs between 1961 and 2005. The
results show that country-pairs facing a larger potential of trade diversion are more likely to form
a PTA in the future.
Keywords : Incomplete markets, Endogenous borrowing constraints, Risk sharing, Eco-
nomic integration, Net foreign asset position, Investment rates, preferential trade agree-
ments, Trade diversion, Probit model.
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INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
Cette thèse traite de trois sujets en macroéconomie en économie ouverte et commerce interna-
tional. J’examine tour à tour (i) les conditions d’optimalité d’une union économique, (ii) l’accu-
mulation des déséquilibres extérieurs et la relation avec l’investissement, et (iii) le rôle de l’inter-
dépendence dans la prolifération des accords commerciaux préférentiels.
Le premier chapitre part d’un certain nombre de faits qui caractérisent l’intégration économique
tel qu’observée actuellement : malgré une croissance accrue des initiatives, les zones de profonde
intégration économique caractérisées par une libre circulation des facteurs de production et une
harmonisation des politiques économiques et fiscales sont rares. Les zones existantes tendent à
regrouper des pays qui ont des niveaux de revenu similaires, et dans la plupart des cas, des pays
riches. Dans le cas de l’Union Européenne qui constitue aujourd’hui l’un des modèles avancés
d’intégration, l’accession de la Grèce, du Portugal et l’Espagne, et récemment des pays de l’Europe
de l’Est, n’a eu lieu qu’après une période de convergence des niveaux de revenu avec les pays
membres. Ces faits sont intrigants parce que selon la théorie économique, on devrait observer
plus souvent les unions économiques entre des pays qui sont plutôt hétérogènes. C’est le cas par
exemple dans le modèle néoclassique de croissance : du fait des rendements d’échelle décroissants,
l’intégration des marchés des capitaux permet aux pays pauvres de financer leur investissements
sans avoir à sacrifier la consommation, et aux pays riches d’obtenir une meilleure rémunération
pour leur épargne.
Le premier chapitre réconcilie ces faits avec la théorie en considérant un modèle d’équilibre
général dynamique et stochastique de l’économie mondiale où les échanges sur les marchés inter-
nationaux des capitaux sont affectés par des frictions : les marchés financiers sont incomplets et il
n’y pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays souverains. Une union
économique émerge comme un arrangement qui pallie à ces frictions entre les pays membres. Ce-
pendant, l’union continue de faire face à ces frictions lorsqu’elle échange avec le reste du monde.
L’arbitrage clé dans le modèle est le suivant. L’intégration économique permet un meilleur partage
du risque entre pays membres et fournit au partenaire pauvre la possibilité d’utiliser la ligne de cré-
dit du partenaire riche en cas de besoin. Il y’a cependant des coûts. Tout d’abord, la limite de crédit
à laquelle les pays membres font face sur les marchés internationaux devient plus contraignante
2parce que résilier la dette extérieure est moins coûteux pour les membres l’union : ils peuvent conti-
nuer à échanger entre eux en cas de défaut. Ensuite, le fait que le partenaire pauvre peut utiliser la
limite de crédit du partenaire riche génère une externalité négative pour ce dernier qui se retrouve
plus fréquemment contraint au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux. Ces ingrédients
permettent au modèle de générer des résultats conformes avec les faits observés sur l’intégration
économique.
Le deuxième essai s’intéresse à l’augmentation de la dispersion transversale des avoirs exté-
rieurs nets et la relation avec la dispersion des taux d’investissement. Cette augmentation au cours
des récentes décennies et les niveaux record atteints par certaines grandes économies comme les
Etats-Unis et la Chine ont reçu une attention considérable. On pourrait attribuer ces déséquilibres
à une réduction des barrières aux mouvements internationaux des capitaux. Mais dans ce cas, il est
légitime de s’attendre à ce qu’ils s’accompagnent d’une augmentation dans la dispersion des taux
d’investissement car le financement des investissements constitue une raison fondamentale pour
laquelle les pays échangent les capitaux. Les données indiquent cependant que la dispersion des
taux d’investissement est restée relativement stable au cours des dernières décennies.
Pour réconcilier ces faits, je construis un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général stochastique
où les pays diffèrent en raison des chocs idiosyncratiques à leurs niveaux de productivité totale
des facteurs. An niveau des marchés internationaux, il n’y a pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter
les contrats de crédit entre pays. Les pays qui font défaut sur leur dette extérieure sont exclus
des marchés futurs et subissent un coût direct : ce coût reflète les canaux autres que l’exclusion
financière à travers lesquels les pays en défaut peuvent être pénalisés. Lorsque le modèle est calibré
pour reproduire l’évolution de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets, il génère une
dispersion relativement stable des taux d’investissement. La raison principale est que les incitations
que les pays ont à investir sont liées à la productivité. Avec l’intégration financière, même si les
opportunités d’emprunt ont augmentées, les incitations à investir n’ont pas beaucoup changé, ce
qui permet de réconcilier une dispersion accrue des avoirs extérieurs nets avec une dispersion
relativement stable des taux d’investissement.
La prolifération des accords commerciaux préférentiels est un élément dominant du système
commercial multilatéral actuel. Dans le troisième essai, j’examine empiriquement un canal par
lequel ces accords peuvent inciter les pays exclus à les joindre ou à en créer de nouveaux. Par
3définition, les accords commerciaux sont discriminatoires : les importations en provenance des
pays membres bénéficient d’un taux préférentiel par rapport aux pays exclus. Du coup, un pays
peut perdre une partie importante de son marché d’exportation du fait de la création d’une zone de
commerce préférentiel entre un pays partenaire et un pays compétiteur. Pour établir l’importance
de ce canal, je construis une variable qui capture dans quelle mesure les exportations d’un pays sont
exposées à cette diversion et estime un modèle Probit de formation des accords préférentiels. Les
résultats montrent que le risque de diversion est déterminant dans la décision des pays de former
des zones de commerce préférentiel.
CHAPITRE 1
ON THE INDIVIDUAL OPTIMALITY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
1.1 Introduction
Which countries find it individually optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize a
particular motivation for economic integration: improving risk sharing. An economic union is a
small-scale arrangement where partners are better able to cope with the frictions that limit risk-
sharing in the world economy.
We consider an initial situation in which countries are sitting in the world economy with very
limited possibilities to sharing idiosyncratic endowment risk. Risk sharing is limited by two fric-
tions. First, markets are incomplete since countries may only trade a non-contingent bond. Second,
international lending contracts are not legally enforceable. At any time, a country may choose to
repudiate its foreign debt. The sanction for doing so is the permanent exclusion from future trade in
world markets. Our world economy model is a variant of Clarida [1990] and Huggett [1993], fea-
turing self-enforcing borrowing limits along the lines of Kehoe and Levine [1993], Kocherlakota
[1996], and Alvarez and Jermann [2001]. Versions of this setup have been studied previously in
different contexts by Zhang [1997] and Krueger and Perri [2006]. 1
We then consider the possibility that a pair of countries selected at random from the world
economy is suddenly offered the possibility of forming an economic union. A union, by assump-
tion, is an arrangement which solves both the market incompleteness and the lack of enforcement
problems among member countries. The union as a whole, however, still faces these frictions when
trading in world markets. Since the endowment risk facing union members cannot be fully diver-
This chapter is a joint work with Rui Castro. We thank Sílvia Gonçalves, Per Krusell, Mark Wright, and seminar
attendants at the Atlanta Fed, Queen’s University, the Washington University in St.Louis/St.Louis Fed, Université de
Montréal, University of Windsor, 2010 Midwest Macro Meetings in East Lansing, 2009 Canadian Economic Associa-
tion meetings in Toronto, 2009 Portuguese Economic Journal meetings in Madeira, and 2009 Society for Economic
Dynamics meetings in Istanbul for helpful comments. Castro acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
1. See Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda [2010] and Bai and Zhang [2010] for variants with capital accumulation.
See also Castro [2005] for a variant with capital accumulation and endogenous but ad-hoc borrowing constraints.
5sified away, they still have an interest in trading with the rest of the world. We focus on setting
where union members coordinate their international borrowing and lending and default decisions,
as if these decisions were taken by a central union authority.
The key trade-off our model emphasizes about union formation, from the perspective of each
individual country, is the following. There are two benefits from economic integration. First,
forming a union improves risk-sharing opportunities among member countries. Second, a union
allows for poor partners to use the rich partners’ credit lines. The latter is a benefit for poor
partners only. There are also two costs of economic integration. First, borrowing limits become
tighter, since defaulting on international debt becomes less costly for union partners. This happens
because union partners may still share risk upon default. Second, since poor partners may benefit
from the rich partner’s credit limit, this generates a negative externality: rich partners will find
themselves more often borrowing-constrained in a union compared to standing alone in the world
economy.
Our model generates not only aggregate benefits, but also aggregate costs of economic inte-
gration. In addition, our model also generates disagreement about union formation, and the dis-
agreement is the largest when the partners are more heterogeneous. These two ingredients provide
a potential explanation for three seemingly puzzling empirical observations on economic integra-
tion: (i) deep economic integration is relatively rare, and when it does take place it tends to feature
(ii) relatively homogeneous partners, and (iii) relatively richer partners. Our paper provides some
empirical evidence documenting these regularities.
These observations are puzzling because, under a very broad set of circumstances, economic
theory would imply that economic integration should happen often, particularly among heteroge-
nous partners. For example, this would be the case for capital market integration in the neoclassical
growth model, or goods market integration in either the Heckscher-Ohlin or the Ricardian models
of trade. 2
2. Union formation in intra-industry trade models, emphasizing scale economies and a taste for variety, have
been analyzed in a static setting by Krugman [1991], Frankel, Stein, and Wei [1995], Frankel [1997] and Baier and
Bergstrand [2004]. This type of model emphasizes size as a determinant of union formation: the larger and the more
similar the partners’ market sizes, the larger the gains from goods market integration. Larger unions profit more from
scale economies, and size homogeneity lowers the losses from trade diversion. While Baier and Bergstrand [2004] find
empirical support for these implications, our data also suggests that, beyond market size, the level and the dispersion
in partner wealth matters for economic integration. Differently from this literature, our paper focuses on heterogeneity
in per capita incomes and net foreign assets over GDP.
6Our framework provides a very parsimonious explanation for these puzzling observations. Eco-
nomic unions may not be formed if either the aggregate costs of economic integration are too large,
or if there is disagreement among partners. Unions are unlikely to be formed among heterogeneous
partners, since rich partners suffer from a negative externality imposed by poor partners. Finally,
unions are also more likely to be formed among relatively rich partners because this lowers the
likelihood of either country being borrowing-constrained in the future, and thus the effect of the
negative externality.
This paper is related to a vast literature that has attempted to estimate the welfare gains from
full international risk-sharing. This literature includes papers such as Cole and Obstfeld [1991],
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [1992], Obstfeld [1994a, b], van Wincoop [1999], Wincoop [1994],
Mendoza [1995], Tesar [1995], Lewis [2000], and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop [2000]. The
typical exercise computes the average gain across countries of going from financial market autarky
to complete markets, and entirely eliminating idiosyncratic country risk. Although the range of
estimated welfare gains is large, the gains are still positive in nearly all the papers. The sole
exception is Devereux and Smith [1994], who like this paper also model costs of sharing risk. In
their case, sharing risk lowers precautionary saving, which lowers output growth and might lower
welfare. We emphasize instead the tightening of credit constraints, and the negative externalities
generated by poor union partners.
The present paper differs from this literature in several dimensions. First, beyond the magnitude
of the welfare gains, this paper is mostly interested on their distribution across countries. Even if
the average gains might be high, they can be very oddly distributed. If some countries actually
experience a loss, as it is often the case in our model, risk sharing arrangements may not take
place at all. This may explain the observed lack of international risk diversification, even in the
presence of possibly large average welfare gains. Moreover, the main prediction of our model can
be tested against the evidence, namely that feasible risk-sharing arrangements should occur among
homogeneous and rich countries.
Second, this paper considers financial market integration as it typically takes place in the real
world. That is, as voluntary arrangements among small sets of countries. Financially integrated
countries are still unable to share risk with the rest of the world. Further, in our paper countries may
save and self-insure in the absence of complete markets, whereas most of the literature abstracts
7from this feature. Our paper computes welfare gains from international risk-sharing that take these
important features into account.
A recent paper that has also looked at potential risk sharing arrangements within small sets
of countries is Imbs and Mauro [2007]. Using actual data on the variance-covariance matrix of
cross-country output growth, they uncover the number and configuration of countries that offer the
best risk-sharing potential. Like in the rest of the international risk-sharing literature, they focus on
going from autarky to complete markets, and do not feature neither costs of economic integration,
nor a role for disagreement among partners. Their main finding is that most diversification gains are
achieved in arrangements featuring a small (up to seven) number of countries, and in arrangements
between highly volatile countries. As Imbs and Mauro [2007] recognize, a natural question is why
we do not observe more arrangements of this type. They argue that this could be because unions
might be particularly costly to sustain among volatile countries, since these also tend to have poor
contract enforcement institutions. While our framework abstracts from cross-country differences
in output volatility, it does provide an explicit, alternative reason for why small-size arrangements
may not be feasible, even in the face of large aggregate gains.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents some evidence about union formation.
Section 1.3 presents the model of the world economy. Section 1.4 characterizes the union. Section
1.5 presents the results. Section 1.7 concludes. Appendix I.1 provides some details about the data.
Appendices I.2 and I.3 describe the decentralization of the union’s allocation and the numerical
algorithm, respectively.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
We start by providing some empirical evidence on the role of wealth levels and wealth in-
equality for union formation. By wealth we mean both income (y) and net foreign assets (b),
both variables being potentially relevant according to our formal model. Our approach is to run a
probit-gravity regression to test whether wealth levels contribute positively, and wealth inequality
negatively, for the probability of union formation. Our regression specification is a straightforward
adaptation of those commonly used in the empirical trade literature to test predictions over bilat-
eral trade flows (see Frankel and Romer [1999], Frankel and Rose [2002]), similar to Baier and
8Bergstrand [2004]. We consider:
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The dependent variable is a dummy which gets the value of 1 if a union is formed between
countries i and j, and 0 otherwise. The regressors in the first two lines of the regression equation
concern factors deemed to be important for union formation but absent from our theoretical frame-
work. The last two lines concern wealth levels and wealth heterogeneity, the key determinants in
our theory.
We begin with the former set of regressors. We include two geographical factors commonly
used in the gravity regression literature, the distance between the main economic centers of coun-
tries i and j (disti j), and a dummy variable capturing whether countries i and j share a common
border (adji j). We also include overall size and a measure of heterogeneity in size, as potential
determinants of union formation, where size is measured by population (popi). In particular, Baier
and Bergstrand [2004] have found scale effects to be important for union formation, consistent
with the predictions of a class of intra-industry trade models. In the last two lines, we include
the overall income level of the country pair (i, j), a measure of the inequality in incomes between
the two countries, and similarly for net foreign assets over income. We make the contribution of
wealth levels and wealth inequality for union formation contingent upon whether countries share a
border, and similarly for size. This specification finds a parallel in Frankel and Romer [1999].
To implement our regression analysis, we combine a variety of data sets. From version 6.3
of the Penn World Tables [Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009] we obtain our measure of income
9(real GDP per capita) and population. We obtain net foreign asset positions from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti [2007a]. We consider real GDP and nominal net foreign assets over nominal GDP averaged
over five years (2000-2004) as our regressors, to prevent high frequency variation in these variables
from affecting our results.
Our geographical data comes from Frankel and Rose [2002], and our union dummy is obtained
from a comprehensive data set assembled by Baier and Bergstrand [2009]. Based on information
from the World Trade Organization, among other sources, this data set provides information on
which countries are engaged in any kind of regional trade arrangement in any given year. The
regional trade arrangements range from Preferential Trade Arrangements, to Free Trade Areas like
NAFTA, to Economic Unions like the European Union. For reasons that will become apparent
when we model unions in Section 1.4, we restrict our empirical definition of unions only to those
arrangements characterized by a sufficiently deep level of economic integration. In particular,
we do not consider Free Trade Areas like NAFTA as a union. This is because members of Free
Trade Areas may set independent tariff policies vis-a-vis non-members, making it in our view
inappropriate to think about them as a block. Our empirical definition of unions therefore includes
Custom Unions (no trade barriers between members, common barriers vis-a-vis non-members),
Common Markets (custom unions featuring free capital and labor mobility between members), and
Economic Unions (common markets featuring harmonization of economic policy, namely fiscal
and monetary). We present regression results for different definitions of economic union, the
results being generally robust across them.
We focus on a single cross-section of 136 countries in the year 2004. The year is the most recent
one in the Baier and Bergstrand [2009] data set, and the number of countries is the maximum given
the available data in 2004. We then consider all possible country pairings from this set. We assign
the value of 1 to the union dummy if a particular country pair was part of a union in 2004, and 0
otherwise. 3 Given the available geographical data, we end up with 6629 country pairings.
We report in Table 1.I our estimated average marginal effects, conditional on either value for
the common border dummy.
3. We treat newly-formed and continuing unions in 2004 both as instances of union formation, in line with Baier
and Bergstrand [2009]. This is a caveat of our empirical analysis since, in reality, there is a likely bias towards the
status-quo. That is, everything else constant, existing unions are more likely to continue than new unions to form.
Unfortunately, the extremely small number of newly-formed unions in any given year prevents us from concentrating
only on new unions.
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Table 1.I: Wealth, inequality, and union formation
Marginal Effects on the Probability of Union Formation
Definition of Union: at least... ...Customs Union ...Common Market ...Economic Union
Distance adj=0 −0.038
(0.000)
−0.023
(0.000)
−0.014
(0.000)
adj=1 −0.037
(0.000)
−0.023
(0.000)
−0.020
(0.000)
Population Size adj=0 −0.002
(0.007)
0.004
(0.000)
0.003
(0.000)
adj=1 −0.001
(0.688)
−0.001
(0.488)
−0.003
(0.248)
Population Inequality adj=0 −0.006
(0.000)
−0.002
(0.042)
−0.004
(0.000)
adj=1 −0.001
(0.795)
−0.004
(0.181)
−0.003
(0.298)
Income adj=0 0.027
(0.000)
0.019
(0.000)
0.006
(0.001)
adj=1 0.0002
(0.964)
0.001
(0.774)
0.0002
(0.966)
Income Inequality adj=0 −0.026
(0.000)
−0.044
(0.000)
−0.023
(0.000)
adj=1 −0.026
(0.015)
−0.016
(0.040)
−0.018
(0.039)
NFA adj=0 −0.013
(0.000)
−0.010
(0.000)
−0.005
(0.000)
adj=1 0.008
(0.153)
−0.003
(0.358)
−0.004
(0.259)
NFA Inequality adj=0 −0.011
(0.000)
−0.005
(0.015)
−0.003
(0.091)
adj=1 −0.004
(0.730)
−0.009
(0.177)
−0.009
(0.166)
Number of observations 6629 6629 6629
pseudo R2 0.5413 0.5398 0.4403
Notes: Huber-White robust p-values in parenthesis, computed by the delta method.
As expected, our results support a negative effect of distance on the probability of union forma-
tion. Regarding scale, the results are somewhat inconsistent with Baier and Bergstrand [2004], in
the sense that scale tends to be detrimental to union formation, except for sufficiently deep unions,
and conditional on countries not sharing a common border. However, like in Baier and Bergstrand
[2004], inequality in scale is generally detrimental to union formation.
We now turn to the variables that are more relevant us. The evidence supports the view that the
larger the partner’s combined incomes, the higher the probability of union formation, especially
among non-adjacent countries. Income inequality is always clearly detrimental to union formation,
and similarly for inequality in net foreign assets over GDP. The combined level of net foreign assets
over GDP tends instead to detrimental for union formation, except for customs unions sharing
a border. The only exception is for countries sharing a border and customs unions or deeper
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arrangements.
We take these results to support the broad view that, even when controlling for geographi-
cal factors and scale effects, wealth levels contribute positively, and wealth inequality contributes
negatively to union formation.
1.3 World economy
1.3.1 Model
Consider a world economy composed of a continuum of small open economies of measure
one. Countries are identical ex-ante, and differ ex-post due to idiosyncratic endowment risk. Each
period, a country receives an endowment of a non-storable consumption good. The endowment
evolves over time according to a Markov chain with a finite number of states in the set Y . We
denote by yt = {ys,ys+1, . . . ,yt} the sequence of events from the initial time period s< 0 up to and
including period t, and by pi(yt) the probability of such sequence. The initial event ys = ys is given
and pi(ys) = 1. We denote by pi (yt |yτ) the probability of yt conditional on yτ where τ ≤ t, and by
yτ ≤ yt the sequence yτ which is a sub-root of yt . We assume a law of large numbers holds in the
cross-section of countries, which means there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Each country is populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent with preferences:
∞
∑
t=s
∑
yt∈Y t+1
β tpi(yt)u(c(yt)), (1.3.1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility u is increasing, strictly
concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions: lim
c→0
u′(c) = +∞ and lim
c→+∞u
′(c) = 0.
Countries cannot completely pool their income risk on world financial markets for two reasons.
First, markets are incomplete: the menu of assets is exogenously restricted to a non-contingent
one-period bond. A country’s resource constraint is
c(yt)+b(yt) = yt+(1+ r)b(yt−1), (1.3.2)
where b(yt) is the demand for foreign bonds and r is the (time-invariant) world interest rate.
The second friction is that international lending contracts are imperfectly enforceable. At any
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time, a country is free to repudiate its foreign debt, the penalty being the permanent exclusion
from any future trade. A country that contemplates debt repudiation faces a trade-off between
current and future utility: defaulting implies higher current consumption, at a cost of lower future
utility due to living in autarky. International lending contracts are self-enforcing, in the sense that
borrowing countries always find the cost of repudiation larger than the benefit, and they always
choose to repay. That is, allocations satisfy the following participation constraint:
∞
∑
τ=t
∑
yτ∈Y τ+1
β τ−tpi
(
yτ |yt)u(c(yτ))≥Vaut(yt), (1.3.3)
where Vaut(yt) is the value of entering financial autarky after the history yt . It is the lifetime utility
derived from consuming one’s endowment each period from the history node yt onwards:
Vaut(yt) =
∞
∑
τ=t
∑
yτ∈Y τ+1
β τ−tpi
(
yτ |yt)u((1−φ)yτ) .
The parameter φ ∈ [0,1] is a direct output cost associated with default. Such additional default
penalty has been considered in the literature, and it has been typically motivated as a way to capture
production disruptions that occur because of lack of access to international markets. As in Arellano
[2008], our motivation is mainly quantitative. Without such penalty, the extent of borrowing and
lending in the model is much lower than in the data.
The representative agent chooses contingent plans for consumption and foreign assets to max-
imize lifetime utility (1.3.1) subject to the resource constraint (1.3.2), the enforcement constraint
(1.3.3), and a no-Ponzi game condition:
b(yt)≥−D, (1.3.4)
where D is large enough that the constraint never binds in equilibrium. 4
4. Note that the enforcement constraint does not prevent countries from running Ponzi schemes: an agent running
a Ponzi game would never default on its debt, since this would prevent him from continuing running the scheme.
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1.3.2 Recursive competitive equilibrium
We solve for the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints. The
state of the economy is characterized by net foreign bond holdings b and by the current endowment
y. The problem of each country admits the following recursive formulation (see Bai and Zhang
[2010] for a formal proof):
V (b,y) = max
c,b′
{
u(c)+β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (b′,y′)
}
(P0)
subject to:
c+b′ = y+(1+ r)b
b′ ≥ bW (y).
The state-contingent borrowing constraint bW is the debt level such that for every possible state
next period, the country is weakly better-off by repaying:
bW (y) = max
y′:pi(y′|y)>0
{
by′ :V
(
by′,y
′)=Vaut(y′)} . (1.3.5)
This constraint allows countries to borrow as much as possible while preventing them from
defaulting in any possible state next period. The state- contingency arises only when there exist
future states that cannot be reached from current state. We assume pi(y′|y)> 0 for all y,y′, so that
bW (y) = bW for all y ∈ Y .
The autarky value Vaut is the solution to the following functional equation:
Vaut(y) = u((1−φ)y)+β ∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)Vaut(y′). (1.3.6)
Let B be the set of net foreign bond levels, S= B×Y the state-space, andAS the σ -Borel alge-
bra of elements of S. We are now ready to define the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
of the world economy.
Definition. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is given by decision rules c(b,y), b′(b,y),
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a value functionV (b,y), a borrowing limit bW , an interest rate r and a distribution Ψ(b,y) of coun-
tries over S such that:
1. Given the world interest rate r and the borrowing limit bW , the decision rules solve the
recursive problem (P0) and V is the associated value function.
2. The borrowing limit bW is not too tight, in the sense of satisfying equation (1.3.5) for all y.
3. The world credit market clears:
∫
S
b′(b,y)dΨ(b,y) = 0.
4. The decision rules and the transition matrix of the endowment process induce a probability
distribution P over the state space, P : S×AS −→ [0,1], where:
P((b,y);A) = ∑
y′:(b′(b,y),y′)∈A
pi(y′|y)
is the probability of transiting from state (b,y) to a state in the set A.
5. The distribution Ψ is stationary and consistent with P:
Ψ(A) =
∫
S
P((b,y);A)dΨ(b,y), for all A ∈AS.
1.3.3 Parameters and computation
Preferences are isoelastic:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ (1.3.7)
with a coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 1.5. The subjective discount factor is selected so
that the equilibrium world interest rate is 1%, yielding β = 0.9815.
The direct output penalty ensures that the cross-sectional standard deviation of the net foreign
asset to GDP ratio equals 0.42, the average cross-sectional standard deviation obtained from the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007a] data set - we focus on a balanced panel of 110 countries over the
1970-2004 period. This yields φ = 0.00231, or about a 0.2 percent yearly drop in output during
default.
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The endowment process is obtained from estimating the empirical first-order autoregressive
process on a panel of countries:
lnyit+1 = µi+dt+ρ lnyit+ εit+1,
where εit+1 follows an i.i.d. N(0,σ2ε ). We include time dummies (dt) to capture world business
cycle effects. We estimate this process by pooling data on linearly detrended real output per capita
from version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables [Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009]. We focus on
a balanced panel of 111 countries over the 1960-2007 period. The point estimates of the key
parameters are ρ = 0.897 and σε = 0.058. In the model we normalize every country’s mean
endowment to 1 and consider the common process
lny′ = 0.897lny+0.058ε ′,
with ε ′ ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1). This process is discretized into a 5-state Markov chain using Rouwen-
horst’s (1995) procedure. The set of values for the endowment level Y and the transition matrix Π
are reported in Table 1.II.
Y
yl ylm ym ymh yh
0.769 0.877 1.000 1.140 1.300
Π
0.809 0.176 0.014 5×10−4 7×10−6
0.044 0.817 0.132 0.007 10−4
0.002 0.088 0.819 0.088 0.002
10−4 0.007 0.132 0.817 0.044
7×10−6 0.001 0.014 0.176 0.809
Table 1.II: Markov chain parameters
We briefly describe our numerical algorithm, the full details are provided in Appendix I.3.1.
The outer loop solves for the interest rate that clears the world bond market. For given interest
rate, we solve for debt limit functions which are not too tight, using the natural borrowing limit as
the initial guess. Finally, for given interest rate and debt limit functions, we solve for the decision
rules that solve the system of first-order conditions for the country’s problem.
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1.4 Economic union
We now describe the process of union formation in the model. We assume the world economy
is in steady-state. At time t = 0, and without anticipating it, a pair of countries sitting in the
world economy is offered the possibility of forming a union. We pick these two countries from the
ergodic state-space of the world economy’s stationary equilibrium. Each country is characterized
by an initial state (bi0,yi0), i = 1,2. We also assume that union formation is a once-and-for-all
event, i.e. once a union is formed it cannot be dissolved in the future.
Within the union, we assume full enforcement, and complete financial markets. 5 Since a union
is comprised of a finite number of countries (in this case two), there is still some endowment risk
that the union would like to diversify away with the rest of the world. We assume union members
still have access to world financial markets under the same conditions as before, i.e. by trading on
non-contingent bonds subject to enforcement constraints. The union is like a small country in the
world economy.
We assume the existence of a central authority in the union that coordinates the international
trade and default decisions. Since union members coordinate their default decisions, there is a
single union-wide enforcement constraint that applies to both countries at the same time. If the
union defaults, all its members are permanently excluded from world markets, but they may still
share endowment risk among them.
The union’s endowment is determined by the realization of two independent and identically dis-
tributed endowment processes, one for each country. We denote it compactly by a two-dimensional
vector y¯t = (y1t ,y2t) ∈ Y ×Y , where each element yit ∈ Y is country i’s endowment realization,
i= 1,2. With a slight abuse of notation, we also denote by pi the transition probabilities for y¯:
pi(y¯′|y¯) =
2
∏
i=1
pi
(
y′i|yi
)
,
where the pi (y′i|yi)’s are displayed in Table 1.II.
5. Note that completing markets may be achieved in a variety of ways, not just by increasing financial market
sophistication. First, fiscal transfers in highly-integrated unions can achieve the same goal. Second, goods market
liberalization may also complete markets. Cole and Obstfeld [1991] have shown that changes in terms of trade can go
a long way towards insuring against idiosyncratic income risk; in some extreme cases trade in goods even provides all
the necessary insurance, without the need for financial markets.
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1.4.1 Planner’s problem
The allocation within the union is constrained-efficient, and can be obtained by solving a benev-
olent planner’s problem. Although countries join the union with potentially different net foreign
bond levels, only the aggregate net asset position matters for the planner’s problem. Let b¯0 =∑i bi0
and let λi be the weight the planner attaches to country i. The planner’s problem is to solve for
{ci(y¯t)}i=1,2 and b¯(y¯t), for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, which maximize the weighted sum of the union partners’
lifetime expected utilities
2
∑
i=1
λi
∞
∑
t=0
∑¯
yt
β tpi(y¯t)u(ci(y¯t))
subject to the union-wide resource constraint
∑
i
ci(y¯t)+ b¯(y¯t) =∑
i
yit+(1+ r)b¯(y¯t−1),
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, to the union-wide enforcement constraint
∑
i
λi
∞
∑
τ=t
∑¯
yτ
β τ−tpi(y¯τ |y¯t)u(ci(y¯τ))≥WUaut
(
y¯t
)
,
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, where
WUaut(y¯
t) = max
{ci(y¯τ )}i∑i
λi
∞
∑
τ=t
∑
y¯τ |y¯t
β τ−tpi(y¯τ |y¯t)u(ci(y¯τ))
subject to
∑
i
ci(y¯τ) = (1−φ)∑
i
yiτ , for all y¯τ ,τ ≥ t,
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, and subject also to a no-Ponzi game condition
b¯(y¯t)≥−D, (1.4.1)
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0.
Apart from distributional issues, the planner’s problem is similar to the problem of a country
standing alone in the world economy, the main difference being that, because the partners’ en-
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dowment processes are uncorrelated, the union faces an endowment process which is less volatile.
Since markets are complete and contracts enforceable among union members, the lower aggregate
endowment volatility translates into lower individual consumption volatility.
1.4.1.1 Reformulating the planner’s problem
Under isoelastic preferences, the union planner’s problem admits a simpler formulation which
is very convenient. By Proposition 5 of Jeske [2006], aggregate borrowing and lending is inde-
pendent of distributional issues. It follows that the planner’s problem may be decomposed into
two steps. In the first step, the planner solves for the optimal borrowing and lending of the union
assuming a single representative country facing the aggregate endowment. In the second step, the
planner redistributes the optimal aggregate consumption plan obtained from the first step among
the two union partners.
Formally, the step 1 problem for the planner is
max
c(y¯t),b(y¯t)
∞
∑
t=0
∑¯
yt
β tpi(y¯t)u(c(y¯t)) (P1)
subject to the aggregate resource constraint
c(y¯t)+ b¯(y¯t) =
2
∑
i=1
yit+(1+ r)b¯(y¯t−1), (1.4.2)
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, to the enforcement constraint
∞
∑
τ=t
∑¯
yτ
β τ−tpi(y¯τ |y¯t)u(c(y¯τ))≥VUaut(y¯t) (1.4.3)
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, where
VUaut(y¯
t) =
∞
∑
τ=t
∑
y¯τ |y¯t
β τ−tpi(y¯τ |y¯t)u
(
(1−φ)∑
i
yiτ
)
,
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0, and to the no-Ponzi game condition (1.4.1).
Given the optimal plan c(y¯t) from step 1, step 2 solves for the optimal distribution of aggregate
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consumption among the union partners. Formally, the step 2 problem is
max
{ci(y¯t)}∑i
λi
∞
∑
t=0
∑¯
yt
β tpi(y¯t)u(ci(y¯t)) (P2)
subject to
∑
i
ci(y¯t) = c(y¯t),
for all y¯t , t ≥ 0.
With isoelastic preferences, the step 2 problem admits a simple, explicit solution. It is relatively
easy to show that
ci(y¯t) = αic(y¯t) (1.4.4)
where αi ≡ λ 1/σi /∑ j λ 1/σj , for i = 1,2. That is, individual consumption is a constant fraction of
aggregate consumption. The fraction is increasing in the country’s welfare weight.
Similarly to Section 1.3.2, the step 1 planner’s problem admits a recursive formulation:
VU(b¯, y¯) = max
c,b¯′
{
u(c)+β ∑¯
y′
p¯i(y¯′|y¯)VU(b¯′, y¯′)
}
(P1′)
subject to
c+ b¯′ = ∑
i
yi+(1+ r)b¯
b¯′ ≥ b¯U(y¯)
where
b¯U(y¯) = max
y¯′:p¯i(y¯′|y¯)>0
{
by¯′ :V
U (by¯′, y¯′)=VUaut(y¯′)} (1.4.5)
and where VUaut(y¯) solves
VUaut(y¯) = u
(
(1−φ)∑
i
yi
)
+β ∑¯
y′
pi(y¯′|y¯)VUaut(y¯′).
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Given (1.4.4), the value for country i of belonging to a union with country j is
VUi (b¯, y¯) = α
1−σ
i V
U(b¯, y¯). (1.4.6)
1.4.2 Competitive equilibrium
To perform our welfare analysis, we still need to recover the planner’s welfare weights as a
function of the initial pair of union partner states.
We use Negishi’s (1960) iterative method to compute these welfare weights. This well-known
method exploits the first welfare theorem, which allows us to obtain the competitive equilibrium
allocation as the solution to the planner’s problem for a given set of welfare weights. By requiring
that the planner’s allocation be affordable under the equilibrium prices, we obtain the unique pair
of welfare weights that lead to the competitive equilibrium allocation associated with a given set
of initial states.
We need to consider a decentralization of the constrained efficient allocation. We consider a
competitive equilibrium with tax subsidies, in line with Wright [2006]. The decentralization works
as follows. Within the union, countries trade a complete set of Arrow securities. In world credit
markets, they trade freely on non-contingent bonds. However, a central government authority in
the union taxes each country’s income in a lump-sum fashion, and uses the proceeds to subsidize
asset purchases. The government’s tax and transfer policy is designed to support the constrained-
efficient allocation. A subsidy is required to encourage union partners to save in those states when
they would be inclined to default. Our procedure is described in more detail in Appendix I.2.
1.4.3 Discussion
Several features of union formation in our model are worth discussing. The role of initial con-
ditions when computing the welfare gains from financial market integration is a crucial feature of
our analysis. Whether a country is rich or poor at the time of union formation is a key determinant
of the sign of the welfare gains. In the international risk-sharing literature, the role of initial condi-
tions has sometimes been sidestepped [Athanasoulis and van Wincoop, 2000, Cole and Obstfeld,
1991, van Wincoop, 1999, either impose symmetry, or look at a representative country], whereas
in other papers [Imbs and Mauro, 2007, Lewis, 2000, Wincoop, 1994] it is allowed to play a role.
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Differently from this literature, however, in our model union formation may entail a welfare loss.
This generates the potential for disagreement about union formation. We exploit this by requir-
ing that unions be formed only when both partners experience a welfare gain, given the initial
conditions set in the world economy. That is, union formation in our model requires unanimity.
For a large set of country pairs in our model, unions only lead to potential Pareto improvements,
with one country loosing. This raises the possibility of introducing side payments to compensate
the losers. Our analysis abstracts from such transfer schemes. In our setup, wealth would need to
be redistributed away from poor and toward rich partners. We suspect the implementation of such
schemes would face strong opposition in poor countries. Moreover, we do not have evidence from
actual integration arrangements suggesting such schemes have taken place. 6 Finally, we believe it
is more appropriate to focus our analysis strictly on the benefits from risk-sharing, separately from
side-payments.
Rather than implementing a pure transfer scheme, the two partners could instead agree ex-ante
on distorting the baseline union allocation, tilting it to the benefit of rich partners. Formally, one
would impose participation constraints at the time of union formation, such that every partner may
potentially benefit from it. This would increase the likelihood of union formation among hetero-
geneous partners, at the expense of future risk-sharing benefits. Presumably, such arrangement
would be easier to implement compared to a pure transfer scheme. We think it would be very in-
teresting to extend our analysis along this dimension. We still prefer to focus on the strict benefits
from risk-sharing in this paper, and consider the role of initial participation constraints and their
implementation in future research. 7
We considered unions with centralized international trade and default decisions. An alterna-
tive setting is one in which each individual member country unilaterally decides whether to default.
Jeske [2006] provides an analysis of this situation. As Section 1.4.1 makes clear, a major advantage
of our centralized setting is analytical convenience, since it does not require solving directly for the
market allocation. Note however that with decentralized default, potentially defaulting union mem-
bers presume continued indirect access to world markets, by using the remaining non-defaulting
6. In the European Union, the Cohesion Fund is a transfer scheme that takes the exact opposite form: resources
are transferred from rich to poor members.
7. From a technical standpoint, we would have to develop a different decentralization of the constrained-efficient
allocation, to deal with the participation constraints.
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members as intermediaries. This increases the incentives to default, and therefore tightens borrow-
ing limits within the union relative to centralized default. All else constant, union formation is thus
even less likely under decentralized compared to centralized default. Our analysis can be thought
of as giving the best chance for union formation.
For tractability, our analysis restricts attention to two-country unions. In our model, since
endowment risk is purely idiosyncratic, additional partners would be potentially beneficial to the
union since they would further enhance risk-sharing opportunities. However, solving the frictions
among union members is also likely to become more difficult and costly as the number of partners
increases. This is precisely the starting premise of our paper, that solving frictions is easier at
a smaller scale. Our model could be extended by introducing a cost of union formation that is
increasing with the number of countries. 8 Such a setting would deliver implications for both the
number and the type of countries most likely to form a union. We leave the analysis of these
interesting implications to future research.
Finally, a country pair contemplating union formation is given a take-it-or-leave choice at time
0. If the union is formed, it is assumed to be forever enforced. Our analysis abstracts away
from the important issue of sustainability of the economic union. Although union breakups are
very rare in the data, they can be ex-post optimal in our model, depending on the endowment
realization. Without an enforcement technology, sustaining the union would require distorting the
optimal allocation, to ensure that the relevant ex-post participation constraints are met. In some
cases this might not be possible, leading to a breakup of the union. See Fuchs and Lippi [2006] for
an analysis of the sustainability of monetary unions with some of these features.
1.5 Results
Our goal is to characterize which country pairs find it individually rational to form a union.
The main benefit of union formation is the possibility of sharing risk with a partner. There are
also costs, however. First, default becomes more attractive for union members, since they may
still share risk upon default. As a result, borrowing constraints are tighter in the union. In our
8. Imbs and Mauro [2007] find that, regarding benefit side alone, most risk-sharing gains would be achievable in
unions of seven member-countries or less. Further, in our model it is difficult for a large number of countries to all
agree about union formation. This suggests that even very small costs would be sufficient to generate to small-scale
arrangements.
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benchmark calibration, the borrowing limit increases from bWi =−0.302 in the world economy, to
b¯Ui = b¯
U/2 =−0.235 in the union, on a per country basis.
Second, in asymmetric unions, poorer country members tend to borrow heavily from the rest
of the world, and exhaust the whole union’s borrowing limit. This creates a negative externality
for richer countries, which find themselves more frequently borrowing-constrained compared to
standing alone in the world economy. Although being part of an asymmetric union tends to be
beneficial for poorer members, it also tends to generate losses for richer countries. Our model will
therefore produce a bias against forming asymmetric unions.
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of union formation. We compute the welfare gain for
each country of forming a union with a specific partner in terms of consumption equivalents. That
is, as the percentage increase in consumption, constant across time and states of nature, that leaves
the country indifferent between standing alone in the world economy and forming the union.
Consider two countries sitting in the world economy at time 0, with states (bi0,yi0), i= 1,2. If
they form a union, the initial aggregate state is (b¯0, y¯0), with b¯0 = b10+b20 and y¯0 = (y10,y20). Let
cW (bi0,yi0) represent a state-contingent consumption stream for country i in the world economy,
from state (bi0,yi0) onwards. Let cUi
(
b¯0, y¯0
)
represent a state-contingent consumption stream for
country i if both countries decide to form a union at time 0. LetU(cW (bi0,yi0)) andU
(
cUi
(
b¯0, y¯0
))
denote the expected lifetime utility derived from these consumption streams. Now denote by (1+
µi j)cW (bi0,yi0) the consumption stream derived from cWi (bi0,yi0), where every state-contingent
consumption level is increased by µi percent. The welfare gain for country i of forming a union
with country j is the µi j that solves:
U
(
(1+µi j)cW (bi0,yi0)
)
=U
(
cUi
(
b¯0, y¯0
))
,
or, with isoelastic preferences as in (1.3.7),
µi j =
[
U
(
cUi
(
b¯0, y¯0
))
U (cW (bi0,yi0))
] 1
1−σ
−1
=
[
VUi
(
b¯0, y¯0
)
V (bi0,yi0)
] 1
1−σ
−1, (1.5.1)
24
where the value functions have been defined in (P0) and (1.4.6). Notice that our welfare numbers
incorporate transitional dynamics.
We next study the separate roles of wealth heterogeneity and wealth levels for union formation.
1.5.1 Role of wealth heterogeneity
Figure 1.1 displays the welfare gain for country 1 of forming a union, as a function of country
1 and country 2’s initial net foreign asset levels. The figure is conditional on both countries starting
the union formation process with mid-level endowment, ym. Union partners are heterogenous only
in terms of initial debt levels.
Several observations emerge from Figure 1.1. First, country 1 experiences a welfare loss for a
large range of net foreign asset levels. The equilibrium welfare gains range from -1.4% to 3.7%,
with a mean of 0.5%. These are low welfare gains from union formation. Comparing with the
literature on the welfare gains from international risk-sharing, the average gain is similar to the
values in the lower end of the range, as summarized by van Wincoop [1999], and in line with those
obtained by Cole and Obstfeld [1991], Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [1992], Obstfeld [1994b],
Tesar [1995], and Mendoza [1995].
Second, Figure 1.1 shows that country 1’s welfare gain is always increasing in the partner’s net
foreign assets. Third, country 1’s welfare gain is increasing in own net foreign assets only if the
partner’s is sufficiently low; 9 otherwise, if the partner is rich, the welfare gain is monotonically
decreasing in own net foreign assets. Put together, the last two observations suggest the key deter-
minant for union formation is the amount of the resources the partner has: a country would like to
belong to a rich club, especially if it’s poor.
Figure 1.2 displays the agreement areas, i.e. the set of initial country states for which both
countries would experience a welfare gain, and thus agree to form a union. Figure 1.2 is restricted
to endowment levels in {yl,ym,yh}. For states above the solid lines, country 1 would improve
welfare by forming a union with country 2, and similarly for country 2 for states below the dashed
lines. The agreement areas are therefore represented by the light-shaded areas.
Superimposed on Figure 1.2 is also an area representing the ergodic space for net foreign
9. Although not apparent from the Figure 1.1, the welfare gain is actually non-monotonic in own net foreign assets
if the partner’s is low enough.
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Figure 1.1: Welfare gain from union formation
asset positions in the world economy, b10,b20 ∈ [−0.302,3.869]. 10 This is the dashed square
located inside each figure. Notice the role played by the world equilibrium in our analysis of union
formation. It determines both the world interest rate faced by the union, and also the relevant
subset of country pairs that are faced with the option union formation.
We begin with the first row of Figure 1.2. In this row, potential union members have identical
initial endowments, but potentially different wealth levels. The figure shows, first, that unions
tend to be formed between countries sufficiently homogeneous in terms of initial wealth. Along
the 45 degree line, and restricted to the ergodic space, countries always reach an agreement. The
disagreement area exists when wealth levels are sufficiently different from each other. Second, we
also see that whenever partners disagree, the rich are the ones with a potential welfare loss. They
are the ones preventing union formation.
Turning now to the bottom row of Figure 1.2, which corresponds to asymmetric initial endow-
ments, we see that endowment heterogeneity makes it nearly impossible for countries to agree to
10. Since the average endowment is equal to 1, these quantities correspond also to net foreign assets to average
output ratios.
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Figure 1.2: Agreement areas (country 1: solid, country 2: dashed)
form a union. Indeed, restricting to heterogeneous endowment levels in {yl,ym,yh}, an agreement
is never reached. Although country 1, the endowment-poor country, would always benefit from
union formation (the ergodic space is always above the solid line), this is not the case for country
2, the endowment-rich country. Only a sufficiently asset-poor country 2 would like to form a union
with an endowment-poor country 1. This effect is less dramatic the less asymmetric the initial en-
dowment levels are. For example, some agreements may be supported with (y10,y20) = (ymh,yh) ,
depending on the initial net foreign asset levels.
The bottom line is that country homogeneity, either in terms of net foreign assets or endow-
ments, is a key determinant of union formation. Unions are more likely to form among similar
countries. The key mechanism underlying partner disagreement is the effect the union generates
on the probability of becoming constrained in the future.
To better understand this mechanism we turn to Figure 1.3. This figure displays the difference
between the probability of becoming credit-constrained in a union and the probability of becoming
credit-constrained while standing alone in the world economy, during the first 100 periods start-
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ing from today. 11 This is computed for each initial level of net foreign assets of the reference
country (labeled “own” in the figure) and of any given potential union partner, conditional on the
endowment being equal to yh for country 1 (relatively rich) and ym for country 2 (relatively poor).
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Figure 1.3: Excess probability of becoming credit constrained in the union
Several observations emerge. First, the excess probability is negative for a large set of states.
This is in spite of tighter borrowing limits in the union: countries are better insured in the union,
hence borrow less in world credit markets and hit the constraint less often compared to standing
alone. Second, the excess probability becomes more negative when the reference country is poorer
and the partner richer. Third, the excess probability becomes positive when the reference country
is richer and the partner poorer. These are precisely the areas of disagreement we identified earlier,
illustrating the importance of our mechanism: asymmetric unions benefit poor countries at the
expense of rich, via changes in the likelihood of becoming credit-constrained following union
formation.
11. Our focus on the short run stems from the fact that we wish to understand the welfare comparisons underlying
Figure 1.2, and individuals obviously discount the future. The excess probability in Figure 1.3 is in percentage points.
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1.5.2 Role of wealth levels
We now turn to the role of wealth (net foreign assets plus endowment) levels. From the first row
of Figure 1.2, we see that a larger union-wide endowment favors union formation. First because,
as we move from the left to the right panel, the agreement area fills a larger area of the ergodic
space. Second because the agreement areas get wider for larger wealth levels, which is particularly
noticeable when conditional on (yl,yl).
Figure 1.3 once again helps us understand the basic mechanism. As we move along any line
starting from the lower left corner of the figure, the excess probability that country 1 becomes
credit-constrained in the union decreases. When both partners are richer they are farther away
from their borrowing constraints, and are thus less likely to face the type of disagreement that we
illustrated in the previous section.
We summarize the discussion of this and the previous subsection with the following. Unions
are more likely to be formed:
1. the wealthier the partners, and
2. the more homogeneous the partners,
either in terms of initial endowment or net foreign assets. Quantitatively, the most important deter-
minant of union formation appears to be partner homogeneity.
1.5.3 Quantitative implications
To explore the quantitative implications of the model, we compute the probability of union
formation conditional on different regions of the state-space. 12 We ask: What is the probability
that two randomly-picked countries from particular subsets of the world distribution agree to form
a union?
In selecting subsets of the ergodic space, we focus on the top and bottom terciles for output
(respectively defined as Yh = [y2/3,ymax] and Yl = [ymin,y1/3]) and net foreign-assets over GDP
(respectively defined as Bh = [(b/y)2/3,(b/y)max] and Bl = [(b/y)min,(b/y)1/3]). We define such
12. An alternative procedure would be to run a probit-gravity regression on artificial data which would be the
exact analogue of the one in Section 1.2, except that the terms involving geography and scale would be excluded.
Unfortunately, due the nonlinear nature of the regression model, the marginal effects would be hard to compare. They
would be a function not only of the estimated parameters, but also of the data itself (actual vs artificial).
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sets in the exact same way both in the actual data and in the model. Since the results are similar
across our empirical definitions of unions, in the actual data we restrict attention to customs unions
or deeper arrangements.
We restrict attention to only three subsets, with the aim of capturing the key implications we
drew from Figure 1.2. More specifically, take country pairs defined by their current output and
net foreign assets over GDP. 13 We consider “Rich" country pairs (both in the set Yh×Bh), “Poor"
country pairs (both in the set Yl×Bl), and “Unequal" country pairs (one in the set Yh×Bh and the
other in Yl×Bl). We also compute the “Unconditional" probability of unions formation.
Data Data, common border Model
Rich 16% 71% 68%
Poor 8% 20% 43%
Unequal 0% 0% 5%
Unconditional 4% 32% 40%
Table 1.III: Conditional Probabilities of Union Formation
Our results are summarized in Table 1.III. The first column pertains to the entire data set. Only
4% of all country pairs are part of a customs union or deeper arrangements. This number is 8%
conditional on poor country pairs, and 16% conditional on rich country pairs. The data does not
feature unions among unequal pairs.
The second column repeats these calculations restricting to country pairs sharing a common
border. The results are qualitatively similar, but the conditional probabilities of union formation
are now much higher. The conditional probabilities in the model are in the third column. They are
reasonably close to the empirical probabilities conditional on countries sharing a common border.
Since our model abstracts from geography as a determinant of union formation, we find it more
appropriate to compare the model’s implications to the data restricted to common border countries.
The main discrepancy is that our model implies low wealth levels are not as detrimental to union
formation compared to the data. Poor countries in the model are twice as likely to form a union
compared with the data.
13. For the reasons explained in Section 1.2, by “current" levels we actually mean five-year averages.
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We conclude that our model seems to provide a reasonably accurate description of the incen-
tives for union formation, namely the role of wealth levels and wealth inequality.
1.6 The European Union: a short digression
There are two aspects of the European Union experience which appear to be consistent with
our model. First, the successive accession waves happened after an important degree of income
convergence has taken place between accessing and member countries. Our model says that this
is an important condition for union formation. Figure 1.4 illustrates this fact. 14 The left panel
represents the accession of Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. Together with the
real income of the accessing countries, the figure also plots the mean real income of the countries
which were members by 1980. A very significant degree of convergence has occurred before
these Southern European countries joined the European Union (European Economic Community
by then), in fact to a much larger extent than the degree convergence that took place afterwards.
The right panel of Figure 1.4 documents the accession of the Eastern European block in 2004.
All these countries without exception have experienced a significant degree of convergence before
joining the European Union.
It is also important to point out that both the Southern and the Eastern European countries
were able to join the European Union when they did due to the sine qua non removal of political
obstacles: the Southern European countries became democracies in 1974/5, and the Eastern block
around 1990. While these political considerations were obviously central, economic considerations
were central too. Accessing countries were required to implement major free-market economic
reforms as a condition for membership. These reforms were no doubt important for the subsequent
economic performance of accessing countries; we would say also for the success and the stability
of the European Union.
The second aspect of the European Union experience which seems consistent with our model
is related to the current crisis involving Greece and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Portugal and
Spain. All these countries became highly indebted in foreign markets in recent times, in large
measure benefiting from German credibility and low interest rates. At the same time, we do not
see any indication that these countries contemplate abandoning the euro area. Instead, it is the rich
14. The countries corresponding to the labels in the legend are indicated in Appendix I.
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Figure 1.4: Income levels upon accession into the European Union
countries, most notably Germany, who are unhappy about providing aid to the Southern European
countries. Our model predicts that poor countries borrow a lot once members of a union, and says
that instability within the union would arise precisely in this form, with rich countries having a
preference for breaking up.
1.7 Conclusion
We have developed a quantitative theory of economic integration based on the incentives to
share income risk. We have modeled an economic union as a small-scale arrangement that solves
the frictions that otherwise limit the extent of risk sharing in the world economy.
Our model emphasizes not only the risk-sharing benefits of union formation, but also its costs.
One cost is that, a country that is part of a union will not be able to borrow as much as a country
standing alone in the world economy. This is because unions have larger incentives to default.
Another cost is for rich countries forming a union with poor countries. Poor countries tend to
exhaust the whole union’s credit limit, imposing a negative externality on rich countries. Our
model implies that economic integration should not happen very often, and when unions do get
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formed it is mostly among rich and homogeneous countries. These features appear to be consistent
with real-world arrangements.
Our paper has abstracted from a host of issues that could be potentially important for union
formation based on risk-sharing. In particular, we have assumed different countries are character-
ized by common and independent income processes. In reality, shocks tend to be correlated among
subsets of countries, which would work against union formation in our model. 15 Further, there is
large cross-country heterogeneity in income risk, with poorer countries being more volatile (Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti [1997]). In our model, this could potentially increase the likelihood of union
formation among poor countries. 16 Finally, there are also differences in country size. All these
issues deserve further scrutiny.
Our paper has also focused on just one particular dimension of economic integration, the shar-
ing of risk. It would be interesting to consider other key dimensions of economic integration
within small scale arrangements, namely liberalizing goods flows (Melitz [2003], Alvarez and Lu-
cas [2007]), labor flows (Klein and Ventura [2007]), and investment flows (Castro [2005], Gourin-
chas and Jeanne [2009], Burstein and Monge-Naranjo [2009], McGrattan and Prescott [2009]). 17
15. Instead, correlated shocks is traditionally emphasized as a motivation for the formation of currency unions.
16. A similar implication follows from Imbs and Mauro’s (2007) analysis.
17. Further dimensions of small scale economic integration that received some attention in the recent literature
include adopting a common currency (Alesina and Barro [2002]) and coordinating public policy (Alesina, Angeloni,
and Etro [2005]).
CHAPITRE 2
THE CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION OF NET FOREIGN ASSET POSITIONS AND
INVESTMENT RATES
2.1 Introduction
The rising dispersion of external imbalances and the record-high level reached by some ma-
jor economies has received considerable attention during the recent years. Chang, Kim, and Lee
[2009] (hereafter CKL) reported that from 1970 to 2000, the standard deviation of the ratio of net
foreign asset to GDP has increased from 29.3 to 55.4. 1 A strand of literature views the building of
these imbalances as a logical outcome of the increasing integration of the world economy. 2 If the
increase in the cross-sectional dispersion in NFA positions is due to the lowering of barriers to ca-
pital flows as in CKL, one would expect the dispersion in investment rate to go up as well because
one fundamental reason countries borrow and lend internationally is to finance their investments
needs. But evidence from the Penn World Tables [Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009] points to the
contrary : the dispersion in investment rates has declined slightly over the same period.
The goal of this paper is to understand the increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of NFA
positions with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates. 3 I undertake a quantitative analysis
of the global dispersion of net foreign asset positions and investment rates. The framework is an
integrated model of world economy featuring a continuum of ex-ante identical countries. They
differ ex-post due to an idiosyncratic shock to their total factor productivity levels. International
capital flows is restricted because of two financial imperfections. First, the menu of assets traded is
exogenously restricted to a risk-free bond. Second, international lending contracts are not legally
enforceable. At any time, a country may choose to repudiate its foreign debt subject to financial
exclusion. I depart from CKL by modeling the reduction in the barriers to cross-country financial
flows through a direct cost of exclusion. This will induce loser borrowing limit and increase the
1. See Faruqee and Lee [2009] for evidence on the rising dispersion of current account.
2. Proponents of this view include Bernanke [2005], Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas [2008] and Mendoza, Qua-
drini, and Ríos-Rull [2009].
3. Throughout the paper, the term “net foreign asset position” is used to refer to the ratio of net foreign asset to
GDP.
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cross-section capital flows.
The direct cost of exclusion captures all kinds of interdependence among countries that may
have developed over time and increased the cost of sovereign default. As suggested by Cole and
Kehoe [1997], I take the view that countries have many kinds of relationships involving trust and
the debt relationships have implications for these other relationships as well. It follows that the
reputation of defaulting countries can spillover to these relationships, making default more costly.
Trade finance can be affected by such spillover. Borensztein and Panizza [2010] argued that sove-
reign default raises the possibility of the imposition of capital controls, affecting the creditworthi-
ness of private debtors even if they do not face solvency problems. 4 Default can also destabilize
the domestic financial system or discourage foreign investors and reduce FDI flows. 5 The view is
that with the rapid integration of world economies that has taken place over the recent decades,
countries have become inter-dependent in several aspects, thereby increasing the margins through
which defaulting countries can be punished.
The model is calibrated the model to match the evolution of the global dispersion of net fo-
reign asset positions for 1970-2004. The implications for the dispersion of investment rates are
then examined. The results show that an increase in the output cost of default within the range of
empirical estimates can account for the dispersion in net foreign asset positions. In addition, the
model reproduces the shift of the distribution towards the borrowing side as we move from a less
integrated economy to a more integrated economy. Finally, consistent with data, the model predicts
a slight decline in the dispersion of investment rates.
The penalty cost of default and the capital adjustment cost are important in generating the
results. On one hand, there is a mapping between the output cost of default and the borrowing
limit faced by countries. As the penalty cost increases, defaulting becomes more costly and large
levels of debt and assets are sustained in equilibrium. On the other hand, the adjustment cost
to domestic capital accumulation tempers the response of investment to productivity shocks and
severely restricts its dispersion. Although the incentives to borrow and lend internationally have
increased, the incentives to invest have not changed much leading to an increased dispersion in net
4. They found evidence that export-oriented industries are hurt disproportionately by an episode of sovereign
default. See also Rose [2005] for an evidence on a negative effect of debt renegotiation episodes on bilateral trade.
5. Borensztein and Panizza [2009] provided an excellent review as well as an empirical assessment of the different
channels through which default can be costly for the economy of the defaulting country.
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foreign asset positions with a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. It contributes to the literature associating
the phenomenon of global imbalances to the easing of financial imperfections. Exploring different
trade frictions, CKL found that a spread of 3 percent between the borrowing and lending rates can
account for the evolution of the global dispersion of current account balances and net foreign asset
positions over the last three decades. 6 Such spread discourages countries from frequent borrowing
and induces them to save, reducing the dispersion in external imbalances. However, this generates
stationary distributions of imbalances that are perfectly symmetric and hard to reconcile with the
data. I depart from their paper in two key aspects. First, they consider an endowment economy and
the emphasis on risk sharing and consumption smoothing. By considering a production economy,
I take into account another major motive for international capital flows : investment. The second
departure is that financial frictions are endogenous. The borrowing constraint is not exogenous but
emerges endogenously from the incentives countries have to repudiate their debt. An increase in
the penalty cost reduces those incentives to default and relaxes the debt limit.
Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull [2009] emphasize the role of heterogeneity in domestic fi-
nancial systems in generating imbalances. They argued that if countries have different levels of
financial development, financial integration can lead countries with deeper markets to build ex-
ternal liabilities, typically by investing in risky assets and financing their investment needs with
external borrowing. Therefore, the model accounts for the composition of net foreign asset posi-
tions and the direction of capital flows. 7 However, the focus here is on the dispersion of net foreign
asset positions.
This paper also relates to the literature employing quantitative dynamic general stochastic equi-
librium models to study development regularities, in particular differences in investment rates
across countries. Restuccia and Urrutia [2001] investigated the role of barriers to investment in
accounting for the dispersion in relative investment rates as well as the decline of such dispersion
over the period of 1960-1985. Using data from the Penn World Tables, they map barriers to in-
vestment to the relative price of investment to consumption goods and found that the model could
explain as much as 90 percent of the 1985 Gini in relative investment rates. Their model is however
6. They also considered trade balances.
7. See also Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas [2008] for a model emphasizing heterogeneity in domestic financial
system, where countries differ in their capacity to generate financial assets from real investments.
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a world composed of a collection of closed economy and there is no international capital flows.
In an open-economy setup similar to the one in this paper but with ad hoc borrowing constraints,
Castro [2005] investigated the role of productivity differences in explaining a set of development
facts related to capital accumulation, including the dispersion in investment rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : the next section presents the empirical evidence
that motivates the study. Section 3 lays out the theoretical model and defines the competitive equi-
librium. Section 4 describes the calibration and the computational procedure. Section 5 presents
the findings and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Evidence
This section presents some evidence pertaining to the distribution of net foreign asset positions
and investment rates over the period of 1970-2004. It is based on data from various sources. Data
on net foreign assets is from the updated and extended “External Wealth of Nations” data set (EWN
II) constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007a]. Net foreign assets are defined as the difference
between total asset and liabilities. 8 Investment rates correspond to investment as a share of real
GDP and are from the version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables [Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009]. A
more detailed description of the datasets is provided in the appendix II.1. I emphasize the following
three facts :
Fact 1 The cross-sectional dispersion of net foreign asset positions has increased over time.
2.2(a) shows the evolution of the distribution of net foreign asset positions from 1970-1974 to
2000-2004. I take 5-year averages in order to abstract from any short-term fluctuations. I also
abstract from the effect of countries with exceptionally large imbalances by excluding from the
sample countries in the top and bottom deciles of the distribution. 9 The top panel of the figure
shows that during 1970-1974, the majority of countries had net foreign asset positions that were
negative and comprised between 0 and 25 percent of their GDP. In 2000-2004, this proportion has
dropped to 24 percent. The mass of the distribution has shifted toward the tails, mostly on the
8. Assets and liabilities include the following types of instruments : FDI, portfolio equity, debt and derivatives.
External assets also include foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold).
9. The figure is therefore based on countries with net foreign asset positions comprised within the 80 percent range.
We are left with 91 and 140 countries respectively for the period of 1970-1974 and 2000-2004.
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borrowing side. For example, more than 30 percent of countries held negative net foreign asset
positions that are higher than 50 percent of their GDP in 2000-2004 compared to 1 percent in
1970-1974.
This dispersion is quantified in table 2.I which reports together with other summary statistics,
the cross-sectional standard deviation of net foreign asset positions. It shows that the standard
deviation has more than doubled, increasing from 0.17 in 1970-1974 to 0.39 in 2000-2004. This
evidence has also been documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007b] in the case of some major
industrial countries and by CKL for a larger sample over the period of 1960-2000. 10
Figure 2.1 – Evolution of the distribution of NFA positions and investment rates, 1970-2005
(a) Net foreign asset positions (b) Investment rates
Fact 2 The median (and mean) value of the distribution has gone down.
The distribution of net foreign asset positions has shifted to the left. Table 2.I shows that the
median of the distribution has moved from -0.14 in 1970-1974 to -0.43 in 2000-2004. The evolution
of the mean of the distribution followed the same pattern. The widening of the 80 percent range
was also more pronounced on the borrowing side than on the lending side, resulting in even more
mass on the borrowing side than on the lending side. For instance, for 2000-2004, there are about
40 percent of countries with net foreign asset positions that are negative and comprised within
the range of 25 to 75 percent of their GDP. More than 20 percent of countries have net external
10. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007b] analyzed the dispersion of net foreign asset positions of some major creditors
and debtor countries over a shorter period of time, and discussed some factors that can explain such dynamics.
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positions that are negative and above 75 percent of their GDP. This contrasts with the fact that less
than 10 percent have NFA positions that are positive and above 25 percent of their GDP.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007a] documented a discrepancy in the data on net foreign asset
and one can think that it explains this asymmetry. They found that the discrepancy has been on an
upward trend and represented a liability of 5 percent of world GDP in 2004. They attributed it to
the underreporting of foreign assets. However, looking at the distribution of the ratio of net foreign
assets to GDP, there are other factors that can explain the asymmetry. One of such factors is an
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers on the financial markets. Contrary to lenders, borrowers
usually cannot borrow as much as they want because of various kinds of financial frictions. As a
consequence, large external asset positions will be more common than large liabilities and there
will be a larger mass of countries on the borrowing side than on the lending side. 11
Tableau 2.I – Summary statistics : NFA positions and investment rates
NFA positions Investment rates
Statistics 1970-1974 2000-2004 1970-1974 2000-2004
Mean -0.14 -0.48 0.21 0.20
Median -0.15 -0.43 0.19 0.21
Min -0.50 -1.44 0.02 0.03
Max 0.19 0.36 0.51 0.73
Standard. deviationa 0.17 0.39 0.75 0.64
Coeff. of Variation -1.15 -0.80 0.59 0.55
Gini index NA NA 0.33 0.30
a The standard deviation for investment rates is for the log while that for net foreign
asset positions is for the level.
Fact 3 The dispersion in real investment rates has declined slightly.
This evolution of the dispersion of net foreign asset positions contrasts with that of investment
rates. Table 2.I reports three measures for the dispersion of investment rates : the standard deviation
calculated from the logs, the coefficient of variation and the Gini index. All these measures point
to a decline in the dispersion of investment rates. For instance, the coefficient of variation declined
11. The distribution of the GDP and its relation with external positions can also affect the shape of the distribution
of the ratio. For example, if there is a positive relationship between net foreign asset levels and income levels, scaling
the net foreign asset with GDP will tend to spread the distribution on the borrowing side and condense it on the lending
side.
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by 6.8 percent, from 0.59 to 0.55. However, this decline is not very big and additional evidence
reported in figure II.2(b) shows that it took place mainly between 1970 and 1980. Based on this, I
conclude that overall, the dispersion in investment rates declined very slightly.
Looking at figure 2.2(b), this decline in the dispersion is barely noticeable. The figure presents
the evolution of the distribution of investment rates between 1970-1974 and 2000-2004. To ensure
consistency, it is based on the same sample of countries as the one used for the distribution of NFA
positions. It shows that the mass of the distribution of investment rates has moved slightly from the
tails toward the mean. For instance, the fraction of countries with investment rates between 15 and
25 percent of their GDP has increased from 25 percent in 1970-1974 to 30 percent in 2000-2004.
At the same time, the fraction of countries with investment rates below 5 percent of their GDP
has dropped from nearly 10 to 3 percent over the same period. The decline in the dispersion of
investment rates has also been highlighted in Restuccia and Urrutia [2001]. They found that over
the period of 1960-1985, the Gini coefficient for relative investment rates has decreased from 0.37
to 0.30.
CKL relaxed financial frictions to explain the rising dispersion of external imbalances (fact 1).
One could think that the easing in financial frictions would increase the dispersion in investment
rates as well (fact 3). In the next section, I will reconcile these facts in a quantitative model of
world economy.
2.3 The model
Given the cross-section nature of the evidence, a multi-country model is in order. Following
Clarida [1990], I consider a world economy with a continuum of small open economies subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. There is no aggregate uncertainty. On world financial markets,
financial frictions prevent countries from full risk sharing.
2.3.1 The country problem
Each country is populated by a constant and large number of identical and infinitely lived
agents. Countries are identical ex-ante. However, they differ ex-post due to an idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock zt affecting their Total Factor Productivity (TFP) levels. I assume that zt evolves
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over time according to a Markov chain that takes values in a finite set Z. I denote by zt the history
of events up to, and including period t : zt = (z0, . . . ,zt), and pi(zt), the date 0 probability of such
sequence of events. The representative agent has preferences over :
∞
∑
t=0
∑
zt∈Zt+1
β tpi(zt)u(c(zt)) (2.3.1)
where c(zt) is the consumption at history node zt , and 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount
factor. Instantaneous utility u is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions :
u(0) = 0, lim
c→0
u′(c) = +∞ and lim
c→+∞u
′(c) = 0.
In each economy, the representative firm produces output by combining capital and labor ac-
cording to a Cobb-Douglas technology. Leisure is not valued and the representative agent supplies
inelastically all his labor - normalized to one - to the firm. Since population is constant, per capita
output is given by :
yt = ztk
(
zt−1
)α
(2.3.2)
where k(zt−1) is the per capita stock of capital brought into history node zt and α is the capital
share. Capital accumulates through old capital stock that depreciates at a rate δ and new investment
i(zt) :
k(zt) = (1−δ )k(zt−1)+ i(zt) (2.3.3)
Changes to capital stock are costly. Accumulation of physical capital is subject to a standard
convex adjustment cost common to all countries :
ψ
(
k
(
zt−1
)
,k(zt)
)
= φ
[
k(zt)
k (zt−1)
− (1−δ )
]2
k
(
zt−1
)
(2.3.4)
where φ is a parameter that governs the size of the adjustment cost. With this specification,
there is no cost in maintaining the current capital stock (ψ(k,δk) = 0). However, changes are
costly : the larger the change to current capital stock, the larger the cost.
Countries cannot pool their idiosyncratic risk on the international financial markets because of
two reasons : world financial markets are incomplete and contracts suffer from the default risk.
41
The menu of assets available on world financial markets is exogenously restricted to a one-period
risk-free asset. In the model there is no aggregate shock and the world’s interest rate is constant.
Combining equation (2.3.2), (2.3.3) and (2.3.4), the aggregate resources constraint of the economy
is :
c
(
zt
)
+ i(zt)+ψ
(
k(zt−1), i(zt)
)
+b
(
zt
)
= ztk
(
zt−1
)α
+(1+ r)b
(
zt−1
)
(2.3.5)
where b(zt) is the demand for foreign bond and r is the time-invariant world interest rate.
The second friction is that international borrowing and lending suffers from default risk. At any
time, a country is free to repudiate its foreign debt and enjoy a higher level of consumption in the
current period. However, this is costly : a defaulting country is permanently excluded from any fu-
ture financial trade and experiences a permanent drop in the output level. A country contemplating
default compares these costs to the benefit of higher current consumption.
Although only a single bond is traded, participation in the world financial markets is attractive
for several reasons. Contrary to domestic capital, foreign bond is risk-free and provides countries
with an opportunity to reach their desired investment level without having to cut down on current
consumption. In addition, because of the decreasing return to scale and the general equilibrium
effect, it provides a higher return on savings compared to domestic capital for countries with large
capital stocks. Finally, it allows countries to avoid the cost of large capital adjustments : countries
can spread large capital adjustments over several periods by using foreign assets as a buffer stock
to save extra resources for future investment or borrow additional resources to supplement current
consumption.
In the model, there is no information asymmetry. Lending contracts are self-enforcing in the
sense that a country will never be able to borrow an amount such that it may be profitable for him to
default. At any history node zt , the resulting constrained efficient allocation satisfies the following
incentive compatible constraint for all possible future states zt+1 in the next period :
∞
∑
τ=t+1
∑
zτZt+1
β τ−tpi(zτ |zt)u(c(zτ))≥V aut (k(zt) ,zt+1) (2.3.6)
where V aut (k (zt) ,zt+1) is the value of financial autarky. It is solution to :
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V aut
(
k
(
zt−1
)
,zt
)
= max
c(zt),k(zt)
{
u
(
c(zt)
)
+β∑
z′
pi (zt+1|zt)V aut
(
k
(
zt
)
,zt+1
)}
subject to :
c
(
zt
)
+ k
(
zt
)
+ψ
(
k(zt−1),k(zt)
)
= (1− γ)ztk
(
zt−1
)α
+(1−δ )k(zt−1)
c
(
zt
)
, k
(
zt
)
> 0
The parameter γ represent a permanent drop in output that countries experience upon default.
It captures all the channels other than financial exclusion through which defaulting countries may
suffer from their decision. The representative agent chooses contingent plans for consumption,
capital and foreign asset to maximize (2.3.1) subject to (2.3.5), (2.3.6) and a no-Ponzi game condi-
tion :
b(zt)≥−D
where D is large enough that the constraint never binds in equilibrium.
The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process :
zt+1 = ρzt+ εt+1 (2.3.7)
with εt+1 is i.i.d. N(0,σ2ε ).
2.3.2 Competitive equilibrium
The model is solved for the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. There are several
allocations that satisfy the enforcement constraint (2.3.6). One such allocation is the autarkic allo-
cation : no borrowing is possible and therefore there is no accumulation of foreign asset because
the world economy is in equilibrium. The allocation satisfies the incentive compatible constraint
because at any history node, the participation value is equal to the autarky value. As in Zhang
[1997] and Alvarez and Jermann [2001] I consider the constrained efficient allocation featuring
borrowing limits that are not too tight. In such allocation, the endogenous borrowing limits allow
maximal risk sharing while preventing default in equilibrium.
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If we denote by (b0,k0,z0) the state variables, the problem of a country in the world economy
admits the following recursive formulation :
V (b,k;z) = max
c,k′,b′
{
u(c)+β∑
z′
pi(z′|z)V (b′,k′;z′)
}
(2.3.8)
subject to :
c+ k′+b′+ψ(k,k′) ≤ zkα +(1−δ )k+(1+ r)b
b′ ≥ max{−D, B(b,k,z)}
c,k′ ≥ 0
where B(.) is the state contingent borrowing limit. Given the current state, it allows countries
to borrow as much as possible while preventing them from defaulting in any possible state next
period. Formally, it is defined as follows :
B(b,k,z) = max
z′:pi(z′|z)>0
{
bz′ :V
(
bz′,k
′,z′
)
=V aut
(
k′,z′
)}
(2.3.9)
where k′ ≡ k′(b,k,z) is the optimal capital stock for next period. Note that the endogenous bor-
rowing depends on the current capital and asset holding only through the decision for next period’s
capital stock. Also, if the Markov chain is such that any state can be reached from anywhere in one
period, then the endogenous borrowing limit can be expressed as a function of future capital stock
only.
The autarky value V aut(k′,z′) in the equation (2.3.9) is solution to the following problem :
V aut(k,z) = max
c,k′
{
u(c)+β∑
z′
pi(z′|z)V aut(k′z′)
}
subject to :
c+ k′+ψ(k,k′) ≤ zkα +(1−δ )k
c,k′ > 0
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In order to define the stationary equilibrium, some notations are in order. Let Ω = B⊗K⊗Z
be the state-space and AΩ the σ -Borel algebra of elements of Ω.
Definition. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of the world economy with endoge-
nous borrowing limits is given by decision rules c(b,k,z), k′(b,k,z), b′(b,k,z), solvency constraint
B¯(b,k,z), world interest rate r and a distribution Ψ : Ω −→ [0,1] of countries over the state-space
such that :
1. Given the initial condition, world interest rate r and solvency constraint c(.), k′(.), b′(.) solve
the problem of the world economy ;
2. The solvency constraints are not too tight in the sense of equation (2.3.9) ;
3. The world credit market is in equilibrium :
∫
Ω
b′(b,k,z)dΨ(b,k,z) = 0
4. Decision rules and the transition matrix of the Markov chain pi induce a probability distribu-
tion over the state-space : P : Ω×AΩ −→ [0,1] where :
P((b,k,z) ,A) = ∑
z′:(b′,k′,z′)∈A
pi(z′|z)
1. The distribution Ψ is stationary and consistent with P, that is :
Ψ(A) =
∫
Z
P((b,k,z) ,A)dΨ(b,k,z) ∀A ∈ AΩ
2.4 Calibration and computation
2.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model using parameter values that are standard in the literature. Preferences are
isoelastic :
u(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ
where σ = 1.5 is the coefficient of risk aversion. The discount rate is set to β = 0.96 and a capital
share α = 0.33 is assumed. Capital depreciates at a rate δ = 0.06 each period. The parameter φ
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of the adjustment cost function is calibrated to match the standard deviation of the log investment
relative to that of the log output in the data for the period of 1970-1974. Table 2.II summarizes the
parameter values.
Tableau 2.II – Parameter values
Description Parameter
Discount factor β = 0.96
Relative risk aversion σ = 1.50
Capital share α = 0.33
Capital depreciation δ = 0.06
Level, adjustment cost φ = 2.00
The productivity process (2.3.7) is estimated from Solow residuals constructed using data from
the Penn World Tables 6.3. I first construct the series of capital stock Kit using the perpetual inven-
tory method. Following a standard practice 12, initial capital stocks are calculated by assuming that
countries were in their non-stochastic steady-state until 1960. For each country i, it is obtained as :
Ki1960 =
IYi
γinγy−1+δ Yi1960
where IYi is the average of the real investment rates, γin and γy are the annual average of the
growth rate of the labor force and the geometric world average of output per worker respectively,
over the period of 1960-1970. Solow residuals zˆit are then inferred as zˆit = yitk−αit , where yit is the
real GDP per worker from PWT 6.3, and kit the series of capital stock per worker constructed from
the data. Since we are interested in the insurable component of the productivity shocks, I estimate
the parameters of the AR(1) process by running a fixed-effect panel regression on the residuals :
ln zˆit+1 = µ+ρ ln zˆit+ui+ εit+1 (2.4.1)
where εit+1is assumed to follow an identical and independently distributed normal distribution
with mean zero and variance σ2ε . I obtain ρ = 0.948 and σε = 0.055. The process is then discretized
12. See for instance Easterly and Levine [2001] and Castro [2005].
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into a 5-states Markov chain using the method of Rouwenhorst [1995]. Table 2.III reports the set
of values for the productivity shock together with the transition matrix Π.
Tableau 2.III – Discretization of the productivity shocks
z
0.71 0.84 1 1.19 1.41
Π
0.900 0.096 0.004 7E-05 5E-07
0.024 0.902 0.072 0.002 2E-05
0.001 0.048 0.903 0.048 0.001
2E-05 0.002 0.072 0.902 0.024
5E-07 7E-05 0.004 0.096 0.900
2.4.2 Numerical solution
The computational procedure builds on Bai and Zhang [2010]. They showed that the solution
to the problem can be obtained by solving a sequence of recursive problems where the enforcement
constraint is replaced by a debt limit function. Starting from the natural borrowing limit, the model
is solved and the borrowing limit is updated iteratively until convergence. The algorithm has three
loops of iterations. The outer loop solves for the interest rate that clears the world bond market.
Taking the world interest rate as given, the second loop starts with a guess for the borrowing limit.
The associated recursive problem is solved and the borrowing limit is updated. This is repeated
until the borrowing limit converges. Finally, for a given interest rate and debt limit, the outer loop
solves for decision rules that solve the system of first-order conditions for the country’s problem.
A detailed description of the algorithm is provided in appendix II.2.
2.5 Findings
In the quantitative analysis, I calibrate the output cost of default to match the evolution of the
standard deviation of net foreign asset positions over 1970-2004. I then examine the implications
for the distribution of investment rates. This section is divided in three parts. I first discuss the
calibration of the output loss parameter. In the second part, I present the implications of the model
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for the dispersion in investment rates. The third part presents some features of the endogenous
borrowing limit.
2.5.1 Matching the evolution of the dispersion of NFA positions
I consider two scenarios. In the benchmark model, the output cost of default γ is calibrated
to match the standard deviation of net foreign asset positions observed in the data for the period
of 1970-1974, that is 0.17 (see table 2.I). This model will be referred to as the “less integrated
period”. In the alternative scenario, γ is calibrated to generate a standard deviation of 0.39 for the
net foreign asset positions, consistent with the one observed in the data for the period 2000-2004 :
this is the “more integrated period”. Note that I am comparing steady-states and the analysis is
silent about the transitional dynamics between those steady-states.
The standard deviation in the model are computed to be comparable with their counterpart
in the data. From the stationary distribution of world economy, I draw {i = 1, . . . ,150} countries
characterized by their initial conditions (bi0,ki0,zi0). For each initial condition, I follow the country
for five periods to obtain a panel for the external asset position to output ratio. 13 The top and
bottom deciles are dropped and the standard deviation is calculated from the remaining sample of
120 countries. The procedure is repeated 1,000 and I take the average of the standard deviations.
Tableau 2.IV – Equilibrium statistics
Less integrated More integrated
Output cost γ 1.1% 2%
World interest rate 3.26% 3.43%
Incidence borrowing constraint 48% 28%
Table 2.IV reports some steady-state statistics under both scenarios. It shows that a penalty cost
of 1.1 percent drop in output is required for the model to match the NFA dispersion for the period
of 1970-1974. This cost can be considered as large compared to models of sovereign borrowing
where international lending contracts are enforced by reputation only. Such models are equivalent
to assuming a default penalty cost to zero percentage drop in output. This high value suggests that
even during the 1970s, the dispersion in international capital flows is not comparable to a world of
13. For each country, the net foreign asset position is calculated as in the data, as follows :
[ NFA
GDP
]
i = ∑
5
t=1
bit
zitkαit−1
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closed economies.
In the alternative calibration corresponding to the more integrated period, matching the dis-
persion of NFA positions for the recent period of 2000-2004 requires a penalty of 2% of output
drop. Interestingly, the parameter values found in the calibration are within the ranges of empirical
estimates. For instance, using growth regressions, Sturzenegger [2004] estimated that default is
associated with an output drop between 1.9 and 2.1 percent for the first year of default. Similarly,
comparing actual GDP with Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, Tomz and Wright [2007] found that
output was below trend by about 1.6 percent in the first year of default, and on average by 1.4
percent during defaulting periods.
The table also shows that the interest rate that clears the international asset market is lower
in the less integrated model than in the more integrated one. As countries are able to hold larger
amounts of debt, world interest rate has to go up in order to clear bond markets. Finally, 48 percent
of countries are borrowing-constrained in the calibration corresponding to the less integrated period
compared to 28 percent for the more integrated period.
Figure 2.2 – Cross-sectional dispersion of NFA/GDP ratios in the model
Figure 2.2 compares the distribution of NFA positions under the two calibrations. It is the model
counterpart of 2.2(a). As in the data, I drop the top and bottom deciles and restrict the sample to the
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80 percent range. The histograms are based on a combination of 1,000 samples of 120 countries
each. Compared to the less integrated period, there is a shift of the distribution toward the tails
when we look at the figure corresponding to the more integrated period. Consistent with fact 3, the
mean of the distribution has also gone down. For γ = 1.1%, a majority of countries have negative
net foreign asset positions comprised between 20 and 40 percent of their output. When the cost
increases to 2%, the mass shifts to the range of 40 to 60 percent of output.
Similar to the data, there is a larger mass of the distribution on the negative side than on the
positive side reflecting the fact that the stationary distribution is characterized by a large number
of countries with small external liabilities and a few countries with large external assets. This
is different from CKL who found a distribution of NFA positions that is symmetric around zero
(see figure 5 in their paper). Such distribution is not consistent with the data on net foreign asset
positions. And as discussed in section 2.2, the distribution needs not to be symmetric even in
absence of the under-reporting of the statistics on net foreign assets.
This distribution is largely due to the endogenous borrowing limit. Because it is state-dependent,
countries with different capital stock levels face different debt levels, generating the dispersion.
This contrast with models with exogenously given borrowing limit where the borrowing limit is
either set to a constant (as in CKL) or a constant fraction of wealth (as in Castro [2005]. In such
models, there is a larger accumulation on the borrowing side. Note however, there we have more
accumulation on the borrowing side than in the data. In the model, there is only a small fraction of
countries with positive net foreign asset positions while in the data, the proportion is larger. One
reason may be the fact that there is not enough dispersion in the endogenous borrowing limit faced
by countries. Still, the results suggests that the heterogeneity in the ability of countries to raise
external capital matters for the dispersion.
Similar to CKL, results here show that a change in the sovereign borrowing environment can
account for the evolution of the global dispersion in net foreign asset positions. Changes in the
output cost of default within the range of empirical estimates are sufficient to reproduce the rising
dispersion in net foreign asset positions. In fact, the output cost to default has two effects. By
making default more costly, it allows countries to hold large debt levels in equilibrium, thereby
increasing the dispersion on the left tail. This reduces precautionary savings as countries are less
likely to be credit-constrained. But the world interest rate has to adjust upwards for the bond market
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to be in equilibrium. This renders foreign asset more attractive for countries running surpluses,
inducing them to build even larger external assets. The adjustment costs tempers the response of
investment to productivity shocks and therefore, capital flows. The building of foreign assets and
liabilities takes place only gradually, generating less volatile external imbalances.
2.5.2 The distribution of investment rates
The implications of the model for the dispersion in investment rates are summarized in table
2.V. Moments are calculated using the same sample as the one used for net foreign asset positions
and the statistics are based on averages over 1,000 simulations. All the three measures of dispersion
reported in the table point to a slight decline in the dispersion of investment rates.
Tableau 2.V – Moments of the distribution of investment rates in the model
Model
γ = 1.1% γ = 2%
Mean 0.198 0.199
Median 0.199 0.201
Min 0.143 0.147
Max 0.242 0.243
Std. dev. 0.100 0.093
Coeff. of variation 0.098 0.090
Gini coefficient 0.055 0.051
This result is in part due to the presence of adjustment cost to capital. But there are also other
factors that govern the distribution of investment rates in the model. The distribution of investment
rates depends on the incentives to invest and the access to resources to do so. These are determined
by the productivity shocks and the borrowing limit. Since I am looking at stochastic steady states,
there is no scope for convergence and the dispersion has to come from transitional dynamics or
a relaxation of the borrowing constraint. However, the borrowing limits only affect countries that
are constrained while the productivity shocks affect everyone. Therefore, even though the world
economy has become more integrated, the incentives to invest have not changed much, resulting in
a relatively stable dispersion in investment rates.
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Figure 2.3 – Cross-sectional dispersion of investment rates in the model
To see this, I solve the model using the same values for the output cost of default but by
setting the capital adjustment cost to zero. Results reported in table 2.V.I show that the dispersion
of investment rates increases slightly when we move from γ = 1.1% to γ = 2% : the standard
deviation increased from 0.24 to 0.276 (an increase by 16 percent). This increase is however still
small compared to that of the net foreign asset positions. The standard deviation of NFA positions
increase nearly by 40 percent, from 0.227 to 0.316.
Tableau 2.VI – Model with no adjustment cost
Investment rates NFA positions
γ = 1.1% γ = 2% γ = 1.1% γ = 2%
Mean 0.197 0.204 -0.164 -0.281
Median 0.207 0.208 -0.268 -0.428
Min -0.033 -0.051 -0.374 -0.609
Max 0.377 0.534 0.594 0.677
Standard deviation 0.240 0.276 0.227 0.316
Coeff. of variation 0.352 0.401 -1.509 -1.129
2.5.3 The endogenous borrowing limit
As defined in equation (2.3.9), the borrowing limit depends on current state variables b, k and z.
However, it can be expressed as function of next period’s capital stock k′ only. In fact, it depends on
52
current asset position and capital stock to the extent that they determine next period’s capital stock
k′ because k′ is also the capital stock under the outside option of financial autarky. Thus, (b,k) can
be summarized by k′. It depends on the current realization of shock z because z determines the set
of states that can be reached next period. However, this does not apply here because all entries of
the transition matrix of the Markov chain are positive as we can see from table 2.III. This means
that from any state, it is possible to reach any other state in one period although with different
probabilities.
Figure 2.4 plots the debt limit as function of next period’s capital stock k′. The first panel of
the figure plots the level of debt limit and shows that the borrowing limit is increasing with next
period’s capital stock. In absolute terms, countries that invest more tend to be rewarded with a
relatively more generous borrowing limit. This result supports the view that it is easier to borrow
to finance investment than consumption. It is consistent with models featuring collateral require-
ments : in order to borrow, countries have to put up some collateral. This reward however declines
with investment as suggested by the second panel of the figure. The panel plots the debt limit as
a share of next period’s capital stock. It shows that such share is declining with the level of next
period’s capital stock.
Figure 2.4 – Endogenous debt limit as function of next period’s capital stock k′
In fact, there are three mechanisms that determine the size of the borrowing limit. The first two
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mechanisms are related to the decision for investment. Note that the debt limit is determined by the
wedge between welfare under the two options : financial participation and financial autarky, both
of which are increasing with future capital stock. Consequently, the overall effect of investment
decision on borrowing limit is ambiguous. Holding everything constant, if the marginal utility
derived from an additional unit of capital under autarky is higher than the marginal utility under
financial participation, the debt limit will be decreasing in future capital stock. The figure suggests
that it is the reverse that is true.
There is a third mechanism coming from the capital adjustment cost. The risk-free asset is also
used as a buffer stock and allows countries to avoid, to the extent possible, costly adjustment to
capital stocks. Investment does not adjust instantaneously in response to a productivity shock as
it is the case in the absence of capital adjustment cost. Even countries with high levels of capital
stock may prefer to smooth consumption through the international bond rather than making large
adjustments to investment levels. Consider a rich country experiencing a bad productivity shock.
Without access to external borrowing, the country will have to cut down on domestic capital in
order to maintain the desired level of consumption. However, such change is costly and the larger
the size of the adjustment, the larger the cost. With access to external borrowing, the country
can afford the same level of consumption without incurring the cost of capital adjustment, by
borrowing on the external financial markets to finance consumption and reducing the capital stock
only gradually.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I undertake a quantitative analysis of the dynamics of net foreign asset positions
and investment rates. The model features productivity disturbances and financial frictions. Inter-
national borrowing and lending are sustained by the threat of financial exclusion as well as an
exogenous drop in output upon default. This drop captures all the other channels beyond autarky
that make default costly. The debt limit is not exogenous : there is a mapping between the output
cost of default and the debt limit arising endogenously in equilibrium. The output cost parameter
is calibrated to match the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion of net foreign asset positions.
First, I obtain parameter values are within the range of empirical studies. Second, consistent with
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the data the model predicts a relatively stable dispersion of investment rates. It supports the view
that with the rapid integration of world economies, countries have become inter-dependent along
several dimensions, raising the cost of living in financial autarky. As a consequence, large debt
levels can be sustained in equilibrium.
On the negative side, the model generates too little dispersion in investment rates. One way to
improve the model on this front is to consider barriers to investment as in Restuccia and Urrutia
[2001] or investment specific shocks as in Castro [2005]. Another limitation is that I do not model
explicitly the determinants of the key parameter, the output cost of default. One area for future
research is to model a specific channel through which default can spillover to other relationships.
These are left for future research.
CHAPITRE 3
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
3.1 Introduction
The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) is one of the major phenomena in
the multilateral trading system over the recent decades. According to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the cumulative number of such agreements notified to the GATT/WTO has increased from
below 20 in 1992 to more than 450 by the end of 2009. 1 About 250 of these agreements were
active as of 2009. Surprisingly, this recourse to regionalism is taking place at a time when world
trade flows have reached unprecedent levels, prompting some interrogations about whether they
are stumbling blocks or stepping stones to a world of globally free trade (see for instance Frankel
and Wei [1996], Limão [2006] or Bhagwati [2008]). 2
The empirical analysis usually focuses on their long-term determinants. Baier and Bergstrand
[2004] found that the potential welfare gains and the probability of PTA formation between two
countries are higher for countries that are closer in distance, remote from the rest of the world,
larger and more similar economically, and predisposed to gain from their comparative advantage. 3
These findings support the natural trading partner hypothesis according to which preferential trade
agreements are formed along the lines of countries that are naturally predisposed to trade largely
with each other (see Wonnacott and Lutz [1989], Krugman [1991] and Frankel, Stein, and Wei
[1995]). In this view, the decline in transportation cost observed over the last decades is consistent
with the proliferation of preferential trade agreements.
The domino theory, an alternative explanation proposed by Baldwin [1993, 1995, 1999] sug-
gests that the trade discrimination faced by excluded countries following the creation of a PTA or
the deepening of an existing one can induce them to join or form new agreements. Egger and Larch
[2008] (hereafter EL) attempted to address this view by investigating the role of interdependence in
1. From the WTO website http ://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm accessed on July 20, 2010.
2. See also Frankel [1997, chap. 10] or World Bank [2000, chap. 5].
3. Magee [2003] found similar results and also that countries are more likely to be preferential trading partners if
they have significant bilateral trade.
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PTA formation and enlargement. Interdependence is captured by a measure of geographical proxi-
mity of the country-pair contemplating forming a PTA to existing preferential trade areas. Their
results suggest that preferential trade agreements that are geographically close are more likely to
induce excluded countries to join or seek similar arrangements.
This paper extends their approach to explore a specific channel of interdependence in PTA
formation : the diversion of imports away from a non-member partner to a PTA partner. This
typically occurs if the duty-free imports from the member partner turn out to be cheaper than
imports from the non-member. 4 The granting of trade preferences creates an asymmetry between
firms inside the PTA and firms from the excluded countries, resulting in a loss of exports of the
latter. And the more the excluded country exports products that PTA members can import from
each other, the higher the risk trade discrimination.
I adapt the trade complementarity index developed by Michaely [1962] to derive a measure
of the exposure to such discrimination : the potential of trade diversion. In this context, the index
captures to what extent products exported by a country-pair match products that PTA members
import from each other. The closer the match, the higher the potential of trade diversion. Using
this measure for PTAs that are geographically proximate to the country-pair, I estimate a probit
model using five-year interval panel data sets of 161 countries covering the period 1961-2005. The
results support the view that country-pairs that are more likely to suffer from trade diversion have
a significantly higher probability of forming a PTA. The effect is robust to controlling for EL’s
measure of interdependence, which is based on geographical proximity with existing PTAs. Also
consistent with existing studies, results show that natural trading partners are more likely to form
a PTA.
This paper relates to the literature investigating the determinants of PTA formation. Most of the
analysis on the “domino theory” are in the context of European countries. In one the introductory
papers to the domino theory, Baldwin [1995] discussed some evidence on the domino effect in
PTA formation. He argued that the European Community’s Single Market Programme constitutes
a special threat to countries from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) because a majority
4. Such diversion is harmful for the importing country if the pre-tax imports from the excluded country is cheaper
than the pre-tax imports from the PTA partner : it is as if the importing country is subsidizing imports from its PTA
partner. This effect is coined by Viner [1950] as trade diversion. This side of trade diversion is one of the effects of
trade preferences that is covered extensively in the literature. It is so because it is a loss for the world trading system
as well since trade is displaced from an efficient supplier to a non efficient supplier.
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of their exports went to the EC market. This threat may have triggered a “domino effect” leading
successively Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland to seek membership. This was
confirmed empirically by Sapir [2001] who was one of the first attempts to take the domino theory
to the data.
Baldwin and Rieder [2007] explored empirically the role of trade diversion in the demand
of membership for European Union (EU) accession. They captured the domino effect using two
variables. The first variable reflects the importance of the EU bloc as a trading partner to the
country and is the share of the country’s exports that go to EU countries. The second variable
captures the deepening of the EU and is a measure of the degree of participation of countries to EU
institutions. They found that both variables have a positive impact on the likelihood of joining the
EU. Baldwin and Jaimovich [2010] explored the “contagion” effect in PTA formation, that is the
extent to which countries tend to seek PTAs with partners that already have PTAs with their major
trading partners. Borrowing from the literature on financial crisis contagion, they used a contagion
index that is, for a given country-pair, the share of exports of the reference country that goes to
third countries with whom the partner country has a trade deal. They found the contagion effect
to be important in PTA formation. The main departure from these papers is that the measure of
interdependence variable is not based on aggregate bilateral trade flows. I exploit the availability
of product-level data to measure to what extent excluded countries are exporting products that can
be prone to trade diversion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the economic
effects of PTAs and describes the hypothesis tested in the paper. Section 3 lays out the empirical
model, discusses the variables used and the data set. Section 4 presents the results and section 5
concludes.
3.2 Evidence on trade diversion and hypothesis of the study
3.2.1 Trade effects of preferential trade agreements
Since the pioneering work of Viner [1950], the analysis of the economic effects of preferential
trade agreements is usually framed in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. There is trade
creation when, as a result of trade preferences, imports from a member country replace goods that
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used to be produced domestically. This leads to an increased efficiency within the preferential trade
area as the partner country proves to be a lower-cost producer compared to domestic producers.
Although domestic producers will suffer a temporary loss because of competition from the PTA
partner, the resources freed can be used more efficiently in another sector where the home country
has a relative comparative advantage. In short, trade creation is welfare improving and therefore
desirable.
Trade is diverted when imports are shifted away from an efficient non-member supplier to a
less efficient member supplier. This typically happens if the duty-free imports from the member
country is cheaper than the imports from the non-member partner. Although the domestic consumer
is paying less for the same goods, the surplus does not necessarily compensate for the loss in tariff
revenue and the importing country ends up being worse off. But the excluded country is also
affected as domestic firms are not competing on equal ground with firms in the preferential trade
area. 5 In such case, if it is not possible to join an existing PTA, affected countries may choose to
engage in a PTA with other outsiders to mitigate these effects.
The logic of the vinerian approach is illustrated in this example from Krugman [1991]. Consi-
der the following scenario of trade in wheat between Spain, France and Canada. Imagine that Spain
can produce wheat for itself or import it either from France or Canada. Assume that the cost of
a domestically produced bushel of wheat is 10 while a bushel of wheat bought from France and
Canada cost respectively 8 and 5 as reported in table 3.I. Assume also that initially there is no trade
preferences and imports from France and Canada are subject to the same duties. Depending on the
level of duties, Spain will either grow domestically its own wheat or import it from Canada. If the
tariff on imports is 4, Spain will import its wheat from Canada, the low-cost supplier.
Suppose that Spain signs a free trade agreement with France and imports from France are duty-
free. If the pre-RTA tariff on imports was for instance 6, Spain will replace the wheat that it used to
produce with wheat imported from France, leading to trade creation. Now, if the initial tariff was
4, Spain will shift away its imports from Canada to France even though Canada is the lower-cost
producer, leading to trade diversion. This diversion occurs because wheat imported from Canada,
5. This is also a cost for the world trading system as this trade is not along the lines of the comparative advantage.
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Tableau 3.I – Illustration of trade volumes effects of trade preferences
No FTA FTA with France
Home France Canada Home France Canada
Production cost 10 8 5 10 8 5
Imports duty 0 4 4 0 0 4
Price paid by :
consumer 10 12 9 10 8 9
society 10 8 5 10 8 5
which is subject to duties costs 9 while wheat imported from France costs only 8. At the end,
no additional trade is created. It is only diverted away from Canada to France, thereby hurting
Canada’s exports in a sector where it has a comparative advantage relative to France. Note that
Spain, the importing country is also adversely affected by trade diversion : although consumers
enjoy lower prices for imports, this surplus is gained at the expense of a higher loss in tariff revenue.
Overall, it is as if Spain is subsidizing imports from France.
In the literature, trade diversion is generally analyzed from the perspective of the PTA member :
the question of the desirability of a PTA boils down to a trade-off between its trade creating effect
(which is welfare increasing) and its trade diverting effect (which is welfare reducing). 6 In this
paper, I take the view of the excluded country and define trade diversion to include broadly a loss
of exports due to the presence of a PTA. From the perspective of such country, it matters very
little whether the displacement of its exports is going to a more efficient producer or not. This can
induce the country either to reduce the price on its exports or to reallocate the resources used to
produced the exported goods to another sector. All those adjustments are costly and this cost may
feed pro-RTA pressures in order to mitigate those costs.
Although the emphasis here is on trade volume effects, trade preferences can also affect exclu-
ded countries through their terms-of-trade [Mundell, 1964]. If a country abolishes duties on imports
from a partner, the terms of trade of the partner improve because its exports become cheaper. Also,
as imports are shifted away from third-countries to the PTA partner, firms in the third-countries
have to reduce their price in order to remain competitive, leading to a deterioration of the terms-
of-trade of the country. Winters and Chang [2000] examined the effect of Spain’s accession to the
6. See Frankel, Stein, and Wei [1995] for an analysis of this trade-off in connection with the transportation costs.
See also Magee [2008] for a measure of trade creation and trade diversion.
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European Community on the price of some non-member’s exports to Spain. They found that the
price of US exports of finished manufactures has declined. Gupta and Schiff [1997] documented
how the Andean Pact had displaced Peru’s imports of beef and cattle from the excluded Argentina
to Colombia, a partner exporting the same products. This has caused producers from Argentina to
lower their prices in order to access the market.
It is also important to note that there are circumstances under which PTAs can increase trade
from non-members. For example, a PTA can raise demand for certain imports from the rest of the
world due to complementarity, raising imports from non-members. Also, PTAs can involve further
opening of markets to international competition, regulations and policies. The increased efficiency
within the preferential trade area can lead to higher income and therefore, larger demand from the
rest of the world. I assume that such effects are small compared to the negative externalities and
therefore abstract from them.
3.2.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses of the study are the following :
Hypothesis 1 : Countries that face a higher potential of trade diversion due to the presence of
PTAs exhibit a higher probability of forming a PTA.
The potential of trade diversion is captured by a variable measuring to what extent products
exported by a country-pair are also traded within the preferential trade area. If firms from a country-
pair are exporting products that are traded heavily by PTA partners, they are more likely to suffer
from trade diversion because they are competing against domestic firms enjoying trade preferences.
By focusing on trade diversion, I am investigating a specific aspect of the domino theory. The
theory as presented by Baldwin [1993] however does not refer only to trade diversion. It refers to
all political-economy forces that can emerge in the excluded country as a result of the formation
of a preferential trade area or its deepening. A preferential trade area represents a big market in
itself and even in absence of trade diversion, firms from excluded countries may increase lobbying
pressure in order to have access to the market. In addition, an increased efficiency within the
preferential trade area can raise demand from the rest of the world, but also its attractiveness, and
hence the incentives for excluded countries to seek similar deals.
Hypothesis 2 : PTAs are more likely to be formed among natural trading partners.
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This hypothesis emphasizes trade gains as a major determinant of preferential trade deals.
Natural trading partners are countries that were already trading a lot prior to the formation of the
PTA. This can be due to geographical proximity which is usually associated with low trade cost,
complementarity or relative levels of economic development. For such partners, the gains from
trade creation are likely to outweigh the loss from trade diversion as suggested by Krugman [1991].
A common proxy of whether countries are natural partners is their bilateral distance. This relies on
the fact that trade costs usually increase with bilateral distance and therefore, geographically close
countries can be considered as having relatively low trade costs.
3.3 Empirical analysis
The model of PTA formation is a qualitative choice model. Following EL, interdependence is
captured by an additional explanatory variable that is function of “ties” with existing PTAs. The
main departure from their paper is the measure of those ties. Below, I describe in more detail the
approach.
3.3.1 The econometric specification
Let N = n×n be the number of country-pairs and PTA?t a N×1 vector of differential in utility
between membership and non-membership of a PTA. PTA?t is unobservable. Instead we observe
PTAt , which is a vector of dummies whose entries take the value of 1 for country-pairs that are
in a PTA in year t, including new PTAs (that is PTA?i j > 0) and 0 otherwise. I assume that the
differences in utility from forming a PTA are function of current and past economic conditions.
However, whether a country-pair forms a PTA or not depends on the value of such difference in
utility in the previous period. This reflects the fact that the formation of a PTA is typically a long
process and agreements entering currently into force are the outcomes of decision taken many
years ago, and therefore triggered by conditions prevailing at that time.
The model of PTA formation is :
PTA?t−5 = ρWt−5PTAt−5+Xt−5β + εt (3.3.1)
newPTAt = 1
[
PTA?t−5 > 0
]
(3.3.2)
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where
– Wt is a N ×N matrix whose entry κ,τ captures the potential of trade diversion faced by
exports from country-pair κ = (κ1,κ2) in the country-pair τ = (τ1,τ2) ;
– Xt−5 is a N× k matrix of k regressors ;
– β is a k×1 vectors of parameters ;
– εt is a N×1 vector of residual terms ;
– newPTAt the N×1 vector such that newPTAκt = 1 if the pair κ forms a new PTA in period
t and 0 if κ was not a PTA in t−5 and t. Continuing PTAs are excluded from the estimation
and the corresponding entry is set to a missing value. 7
– 1[.] is the indicator function.
The effect of past PTAs on the current ones is captured by Wt−5PTAt−5, a variable placing
weight on country-pairs that are in a PTA in period t − 5. The measure gives more weight to
existing PTA at time t−5 which are more likely to divert trade with the outsider country-pair. The
conjecture is that this trade diversion would encourage the outsider to form a PTA 5 years later.
A few remarks are in order. First, in each period we are interested in the effect of pre-existing
PTAs on the new ones and the dependent variable is therefore restricted to country-pairs that were
not in a PTA in the previous period, that is PTAit−5 = 0. This is a restriction compared to EL who
estimated separate models for continuing PTAs, new PTAs and PTA enlargement. The restriction
however is without a loss of generality since their results did not change much across the three
specifications. A consequence of this choice is that the number of observations for the dependent
variable is declining with time as continuing PTAs are dropped. 8
Second, I abstract from short-term fluctuations in some of the independent variables by aggre-
gating the panel into 9 periods of five-year intervals covering the period 1961-2005. This has the
advantage of increasing the variability in the dependent variable : any agreement created during one
of the five years is considered as a PTA formation while the non-existence of such agreement for
all the five years is combined into one single observation of no agreement. Each period covers the
years {t−2, . . . , t+2}with t taking values in {1963,1968,1973,1978,1983,1988,1993,1998,2003}.
7. This trick is used only to keep the vectorial notation consistent. One way to avoid this is to make the dimension
of the matrices time-dependent.
8. I assume that those are the only countries that can create a PTA in period t and by doing so, ignore the death of
PTAs. In practice, such events are rare in the sample.
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With a little abuse of notation, I use the subscript t to denote the 5-year period, and t−5 and t+5
to denote respectively the previous and the next period.
The model defined by equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) belongs to the class of models with a spa-
tially lagged dependent variable. A frequent issue with these models is that the spatial lag is usually
endogenous and correlated to the error terms, leading to a bias in the coefficient estimates when the
endogeneity is not properly taken into account. This specification is however purely a space recur-
sive model as PTAt−5 is pre-determined at time t and there is no serial correlation in the residuals
[Ward and Gleditsch, 2008].
3.3.2 Construction of the weighting matrix W
The weighting matrix W is derived from TD, a matrix whose entries measure the potential of
trade diversion between country-pairs, and D a matrix of distances.
3.3.2.1 The potential of trade diversion TD
TD is a N ×N matrix measuring the potential of trade diversion faced by exports from a
country-pair κ in the market of another country-pair τ . To measure this potential, I adapt the
trade complementarity index developed by Michaely [1962]. The trade complementarity index
was developed originally for comparing trade profiles at country levels : it shows how well the
exports structure (supply) of a country matches the imports profile (demand) of a partner. As such,
it provides a useful information on the prospects for bilateral trade.
I extend this logic at country-pair level to measure to what extent exports from a country-
pair are likely to suffer from trade diversion in another country-pair. The idea is the following :
if countries {κi}i=1,2 are exporting to the world products that are similar to the ones countries
{τi}i=1,2 are importing from each other, the prospect of a trade deal between {τi} is potentially
harmful to exporters from {κi}. The granting of mutual tariff preferences renders bilateral imports
between τ1 and τ2 cheaper, creating an asymmetry between firms in κ and firms in τ : consumers
within the preferential trade area are likely to divert their demand away from κ1,κ2 to their PTA
partner. This asymmetry can nourish politico-forces for the creation of a PTA in κ1,κ2.
Formally, let xkκt be the share of product k in the aggregate exports of {κi}i=1,2 to the world and
mkτt the share of the same commodity in the imports of {τi}i=1,2 from each other. The potential of
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trade diversion faced by exports from κ in the market of τ is defined as :
TDκτt = 1− 12∑k
∣∣∣xkκt−mkτt∣∣∣ (3.3.3)
The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 reflecting perfect complementarity between exports of κ
and bilateral imports of τ , and therefore a higher potentiality of trade diversion. The extreme case
where the index is zero reflects a situation in which none of the product exported by κ1,κ2 are
traded between τ1 and τ2. In such case, there is no scope for trade diversion since firms from κ do
not have any competitor in τ . Note that the index is not symmetric : the potential of trade diversion
faced by exports from κ in the market τ is not the same as the potential of diversion faced by
exports of τ in κ .
3.3.2.2 Distance D :
The distance between two country-pairs κ and τ is defined as the average distance between all
the combinations of two countries from one pair and the other :
Dκτ =
1
4
2
∑
i=1
2
∑
j=1
DISTκiτ j (3.3.4)
where DISTκiτ j is the bilateral distance between countries κi and τ j measured in kilometers (kms).
I use D here to restrict some entries of the weighting matrixW to zero because its construction
is computationally intense. For instance, with 161 countries, W is a 25,921× 25,921 matrix and
the memory requirement becomes quickly an issue. 9
3.3.2.3 The weighting matrix W
Given TDt and D, the weighting matrix Wt is defined by :
Wt = TDt×1[D< 2000 kms] (3.3.5)
I restrictWκτt to be zero for country-pairs that are more than 2,000 kms apart. 10 Rows ofWt are
9. The interdependence variable WtPTAt is computed in Lahey/Fujitsu Fortran 95.
10. This threshold is also used in Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch’s (2010) analysis of the timing of PTAs.
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normalized to sum to unity. The main departure from EL is the definition of the non-zero entries
of the weighting matrix. In their paper, it is based on the inverse distance (e−Dκτ/500) while here, it
is based on the potential for trade diversion.
3.3.3 Other Variables
The dependent variable newPTAi jt is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if there is
a preferential trade agreement between countries i and j entering in force in period t, and 0 if
there is no PTA. As discussed previously, the country-pair i j is then dropped from the dependent
variable sample and the corresponding entry in the vector newPTA is set to a missing value. As a
consequence of this assumption, all the country-pairs that were in a PTA before 1961, the beginning
of the period of study were dropped from the analysis. 11
The explanatory variables are :
– NATURAL (-) is the logarithm of the bilateral distance and captures the natural trading
partner hypothesis :
NATURALi j = logDISTi j
Thee idea is that countries that are closer geographically tend to have lower trade costs and
therefore can consume more of each other’s varieties. Hence, they have a natural predispo-
sition to trade largely with each other. A trade deal between such countries raises welfare
because it is likely to be more trade creating than trade diverting [Krugman, 1991].
– RGDPsum (+) is the sum of real GDP and captures the market size of the country-pair :
RGDPsumi jt = log
(
RGDPit+RGDPjt
)
where RGDPit and RGDPit are real GDP for i and j in year t. It is expected to affect positively
the probability of PTA formation : the larger the market size, the bigger is the scope for trade
gains because there are more varieties available for consumption and welfare is increasing
with varieties. In addition, there is room for greater competition and specialization.
11. They were re-included in the dependent variable only if the agreement has broken down.
66
– RGDPsim (+) measures the similarity between two countries in terms of the economic size :
RGDPsimi jt = log
[
1−
(
RGDPit
RGDPit+RGDPjt
)2
−
(
RGDPjt
RGDPit+RGDPjt
)2]
The measure ranges from 0 to 1. An index close to 0 reflects an asymmetric country-pair :
one of the countries accounts for almost all of the pair’s GDP. On the other hand, a value
close to zero is indicative that the two countries are of similar size.
– DKL (+/-) is the absolute of the difference in real GDP per capita :
DKLi jt = log
∣∣∣∣RGDPitPOPit − RGDPjtPOPjt
∣∣∣∣
There are opposite views on the relationship between income differences and the likelihood
of PTA formation. Krueger [1999] argued that a preferential trade agreement between a
developed and a developing country is more likely to improve welfare than one between
two similar countries because similar countries have less scope for trade gains based on
comparative advantage.
However, from a political economy perspective, preferential trade agreements are more dif-
ficult between countries with large differences in income per capita because of possible poli-
tical opposition in the rich partner. 12 An evidence supporting this argument is the formation
of the Canada-US free trade area (CUSTA) and the extension to Mexico (NAFTA). The ne-
gotiation of the free trade area between US and Mexico (which will lead to the creation of
the NAFTA) faced more opposition from the US House and Senate that the formation of the
CUSTA itself (see Beaulieu [2002]).
I also include the square of DKL to capture any nonlinearity in the relationship with income
per capita.
– REMOTE(+) measures to what extent a pair of continental trading partners are far from other
countries :
REMOTEi j = Continenti j
1
2
{
log
(
∑
k 6= j
DISTik
n−1
)
+ log
(
∑
k 6=i
DIST jk
n−1
)}
12. See Levy [1997] for a discussion of some political economy arguments.
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where Continenti j = 1 if i and j are on the same continent and n, the number of countries.
Welfare of two continental trading partners increases with their remoteness from the rest of
the world. The variable takes the value of zero for countries located on different continents.
– DROWKL(+) is a measure of the relative factor endowment between a country-pair and the
rest of the world :
DROWLi jt =
1
2
{∣∣∣∣∑k 6=iRGDPkt∑k 6=iPOPkt − RGDPitPOPit
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∑k 6= jRGDPkt∑k 6=iPOPkt − RGDPjtPOPjt
∣∣∣∣}
Note that Baier and Bergstrand [2004] use capital-labor ratios. However, due to the availabi-
lity of data, I follow EL and use differences in real GDP per capita.
3.3.4 Data sources and measurement issues
The analysis is based on a combination of a variety of data sets. The PTA dummy is obtained
from a comprehensive data set assembled by Baier and Bergstrand [2009]. Based on information
from the World Trade Organization among other sources, this data set covers 195 countries and
provides information on which countries are engaged in any kind of preferential trade arrangement
between 1960 and 2005. PTAs include, by increasing degree of integration, non reciprocal pre-
ferential trade agreements given by developed nations to developing countries, preferential trade
agreements, free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic unions. I exclude
non reciprocal PTAs from the analysis and group all the others under the terminology of PTA.
Data on bilateral trade flows is from the NBER-United Nations Trade Data constructed by
Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo [2005]. Combining data from Statistics Canada’s World Trade
Database and the United Nations Commodity Trade database (UN Comtrade), this database pro-
vides information on bilateral imports at 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC),
revision 2 for the period 1962-2000. An interesting feature of this database is that they use prima-
rily the trade flow as reported by the importing country and adopt mirror statistics when such data
is not available, thereby increasing the coverage. In the calculation of the trade complementarity
index, I aggregate the data to obtain flows at 2-digit SITC level (divisions), yielding 73 items.
The bilateral distance measure is downloaded from the CEPII website. 13 The dataset covers
13. http ://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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225 countries and presents, among other distance between the most populated cities or agglo-
merations in the countries calculated following the great circle formula. Data on real GDP and
population are obtained from the World Bank’s (2009) World Development Indicators. Real GDP
corresponds to GDP measured in 2000 US dollars.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 RTA formation and summary statistics
I start with some summary statistics about PTA formation over the period of study. Figure
3.1 presents the number of country-pairs that have formed a new PTA during each of the 5-years
periods from 1961 to 2005. Note that I do not differentiate between bilateral and multilateral PTAs :
any enlargement is considered as the creation of a PTA between the new member and each of the
existing member. This differs from EL who considered separately the formation of new PTAs from
the enlargement of existing ones. 14
Figure 3.1 – Number of country-pairs forming a new PTA between 1961 and 2005
Over the whole period of 1961-2005, about 1,499 country-pairs have formed a PTA. From the
figure, it is possible to identify periods of active PTA formation and periods of relatively slow PTA
14. For instance, the accession of Greece to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981 is treated as the
creation of a bilateral PTA between Greece and each of the countries that were already member.
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formation. For instance, between 1971 and 1975, about 220 country-pairs entered a PTA. This
reflects among others the formation of the Caribbean Community 15 and the first enlargement of
the European Community with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The
second wave of regionalism occured between 1981 and 1985. A major event during this period
is the accession of Greece to the EC and the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a
common market between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
Another interesting fact from the figure is that since 1991-1995, the number of new country-
pairs forming a PTA remains high, well above 2000. For instance, 318 country-pairs formed a PTA
between 1991 and 1995. One could attribute this proliferation to the enlargement of major PTAs
such as the European Community because a single country joining one of these PTAs is treated
as the creation of as many bilateral PTAs as there are countries. This period is marked by several
free trade areas involving the European Community (former EEC) and countries such as Andorra,
Bulgaria, Czech and Slovakia, the creation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) in Latin
America and the creation of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
However, this was also a period of dynamic regionalism with countries moving towards bilate-
ral trade agreements as well. An indicator that would not be prone to the effect of the enlargement
of large preferential trade areas is the number of PTAs notified to the WTO. Such number is not
affected by the size of multilateral PTAs since bilateral PTAs and multilateral PTAs are counted
identically. A study by Crawford and Fiorentino [2005] reported that from 1995 to 2005, 196 new
PTAs have been notified to the World Trade Organization, compared to 124 PTAs during the 4
decades of the GATT era. The figure clearly suggests that if there is interdependence, the effects
must have been stronger over the last two decades.
3.4.2 Estimation results
Table 3.II presents the results of the panel data model estimation of the determinants of PTA
formation. I report the results under three different specifications. All these specification differ in
the weighting matrix used to capture interdependence.
15. The Caribbean Community was established in 1973 as a customs union between Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago. Seven countries will join the next year, raising the number of members to 11. These are :
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines. Suriname will join later in 1995 and Haiti in 2002.
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In Column (1) I report the results in a basic specification that does not take into account inter-
dependence, that is, all the elements ofWt−5 are set to zero. In column (2), I use the distance-based
weighting matrix as in EL. It is therefore a replication of their results although I do not differential
between PTA formation and PTA enlargement. 16 Column (3) presents results in the case where
the weighting matrix is based on the measure of the potential of trade diversion.
Comparing across the specifications, the effects of the common variables are unchanged and in
general, not qualitatively different from the other studies such as Baier and Bergstrand [2004] or
EL. The results confirm the importance of natural trading partners in PTA formation. The coeffi-
cient on the natural logarithm of the bilateral distance in negative and highly significant, suggesting
that PTAs are more likely to be formed among countries that are geographically close. I also find
that PTAs are more likely to be formed between larger countries (βˆRGDPsum > 0) and also countries
that are of similar size in terms of their GDP share (βˆRGDPsim > 0).
Turning to income differences, I find a positive effect of the difference in income per capita
on the probability of PTA formation. However, the coefficient of the square term is negative and
significant, suggesting that the relationship is in fact non linear. This is in favor of Krueger’s (1999)
logic of trade gains based on comparative advantage for countries with different levels of income
per capita. EL found a negative coefficient on the difference in GDP per capita and a positive one
on the squared-term. The results is however not robust since results from the cross-sectional probit
show the reverse sign.
Considering variables measuring the situation of the country-pair compared to the rest of the
world, I find that a pair of remote countries (but located on the same continent) are more likely to
form a PTA (βREMOTE > 0). This support the argument of Frankel, Stein, and Wei [1995] that the
welfare from forming a PTA between such pair of countries is higher because there is less scope
for trade diversion with the rest of the world. The reason is that such pair of countries is already
trading less with the rest of the world because they are more likely to face higher transport costs
with such partners.
16. Another key difference is that they treat multilateral PTAs as a single country.
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Tableau 3.II – Panel Probit results for the probability of a new
PTA, 1966 and 2005
Dependent variable : newPTAs
(1) (2) (3)
Wt−5PTAt−5
Trade diversion 1.762**
-0.15
Distance-based 2.492**
-0.208
NATURAL -0.820** -0.733** -0.684**
-0.036 -0.036 -0.036
RGDPsum 0.206** 0.217** 0.192**
-0.014 -0.015 -0.014
RGDPsim 0.190** 0.197** 0.177**
-0.018 -0.02 -0.018
DKL 0.236** 0.216** 0.193**
-0.06 -0.064 -0.06
square DKL -0.110** -0.112** -0.103**
-0.017 -0.018 -0.017
REMOTE 0.037** 0.041** 0.037**
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005
DRWOWKL -0.031** -0.030** -0.030**
-0.011 -0.012 -0.011
Constant -0.229 -1.435** -1.115**
-0.335 -0.373 -0.341
Pseudo-R2 0.361 0.377 0.374
Observations 54 113 54 113 54 113
Nb of country-pairs 11 893 11 893 11 893
Notes : Standard errors are reported below the coefficients.
∗ significant at 5% ; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
I now turn to the interdependence variables. Consistent with EL’s finding, country-pairs that
are geographically close to PTAs are more likely to form a PTA themselves (column (2)). The
coefficient estimate is 2.42 and significant at 1 percent level, a value that is within the the range
of their estimates. Results in column (3) point to a significant impact of the potential of trade
diversion on the likelihood of two countries forming a PTA. I find a point estimate coefficient
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of 1.76, supporting the view that countries that face a higher risk of trade diversion due to the
presence of neighboring preferential trade agreements are more likely to enter a PTA themselves
the following years. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent level. To measure the goodness-of-fit
of the model, I report the pseudo R2. For the model with interdependence, the pseudo R2 is 0.37,
suggesting that the model “explains” about 37 percent of variation in the formation of new PTAs. 17
3.4.3 Robustness check
The measure of trade diversion shares a common feature with EL’s distance-based measure :
it uses the same criteria to select country-pairs considered as geographically close. Hence, it is
possible that the results are driven by a common determinant : distance. To show that this is not
the case, I consider alternative specifications including both measures.
Tableau 3.III – Panel estimation of PTA formation : marginal effects
Dependent variable : newPTA
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Prob. Marg. Prob. Marg. Prob. Marg.
Wt−5PTAt−5
Trade diversion 0.799** 0.003** 0.0004** 1.175** 0.005**
-0.211 0.002 0.00009 -0.281 0.002
Distance-based 1.814** 0.007** 0.0005** 2.037** 0.009**
-0.273 0.001 0.00011 -0.296 0.002
Interaction of both 4.042** -1.688
-0.397 -0.866
Pseudo-R2 0.378 0.370 0.378
Observations 54 113 54 113 54 113
Number of id 11 893 11 893 11 893
Notes : Standard errors are reported below the coefficients.
∗ significant at 5% ; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
As can be seen from columns (1A) and (3A), the coefficient on the trade-diversion based inter-
dependence variable is positive, supporting the view that this measure captures more than geo-
graphical proximity with existing PTAs. The coefficient on the distance-based weighting matrix
17. The pseudo R2 is calculated as one minus the ratio of the log-likelihood value for the estimated model to that
for the model with only an intercept.
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is however higher, suggesting the predominance of distance in PTA formation. It is important to
note that the two effects are not exclusive. For instance, one can think about the trade-diversion
based measure as important in inducing countries to seek a PTA, and the distance-based measure
as important in their choice of the PTA partner.
The importance of the two determinants is confirmed in columns (1B), (2B) and (3B) reporting
the marginal effects of each of the measures. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of
the independent variables and correspond to the effect of these variables on the probability of
a positive outcome. Although these variables are not measuring any economic quantity and the
interpretation of their coefficient in isolation does not make much sense, their relative magnitude
can be informative. These results show that the interdependence measure based on trade diversion
is economically significant, even when distance is controlled for. The marginal effect is significant
but roughly half of the effect of the distance-based measure.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I extend Egger and Larch [2008] to explore the role of trade diversion in PTA
formation. Using product-level trade data, I derive an index capturing to what extent products
exported by excluded countries are likely to suffer from trade diversion in preferential trade areas.
The index measures the similarity between products exported by the outsiders and products that
PTA members import from each other. The closer the match, the higher the potential of trade
diversion. I find a significant effect of the threat of trade diversion on the probability of PTA
formation. The result is robust to controlling for distance-based measure of interdependence. The
results support also the importance of the natural trading partner hypothesis in PTA formation, that
is, countries that are closer geographically exhibit a higher probability of entering a PTA.
This paper focuses on a particular aspect of interdependence in PTA formation : trade diversion.
However, there are several other aspects that worth exploring, one of them being the terms of trade
effects [Kowalczyk and Riezman, 2009, Winters and Chang, 2000]. In addition, as suggested by
Baldwin [1993], the deepening of an existing PTA can induce excluded countries to seek similar
arrangements as well. All those aspects are left for future research.
CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE
Cette thèse a traité de trois sujets en macroéconomie ouverte et commerce international. J’ai
examiné tour à tour les conditions sous lesquelles il est optimal de former une union économique,
le phénomène d’accumulation des déséquilibres extérieurs et la relation avec l’investissement, et
la prolifération des accords commerciaux préférentiels.
Le premier chapitre a identifié - du point de vue du revenu et du niveau des avoirs extérieurs
nets - les conditions sous lesquelles il est optimal pour les pays de former une union économique.
Contrairement à la littérature, le modèle capture non pas seulement les bénéfices mais également
les coûts de l’intégration économique. Les bénéfices proviennent d’un meilleur partage du risque
entre pays membres et d’une gestion plus efficace des lignes de crédit, notamment dans les situa-
tions où un des pays est contraint et l’autre ne l’est pas. Mais une telle opportunité n’est pas sans
conséquence pour le partenaire riche qui se retrouve plus fréquemment contraint au niveau des
marchés internationaux des capitaux. Conformément aux faits empiriques établis, le modèle prédit
que les unions économiques sont rares et tendent à regrouper des partenaires généralement riches
et/ou relativement homogènes.
Certains aspects de l’analyse peuvent être approfondis et d’autres directions, explorées plus
en détails. Par exemple, une des hypothèses retenues est que les chocs de productivité entre les
pays sont indépendants. En réalité, avec l’intégration accrue des marchés et la mondialisation des
échanges les économies sont devenues plus interdépendantes et les chocs tendent à être corrélés.
D’autre part, l’analyse s’était limitée à la dimension “partage de risque” comme motivation de
l’intégration économique. Il serait intéressant d’explorer les autres motivations comme la libre
circulation des biens (Melitz [2003], Alvarez and Lucas [2007]), la libre circulation de la main
d’œuvre (Klein and Ventura [2007]) et des investissements (Castro [2005], Burstein and Monge-
Naranjo [2009], McGrattan and Prescott [2009]).
L’analyse des déséquilibres extérieurs menée dans le deuxième chapitre montre que la disper-
sion croissante des avoirs extérieurs nets résultant d’une réduction des barrières aux mouvements
des capitaux ne se traduit pas nécessairement par une dispersion accrue des taux d’investissement.
Ceci, parce qu’en dépit d’une meilleure intégration des marchés financiers, les incitations à investir
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peuvent rester inchangées. Dans l’analyse, j’ai fait abstraction des différentes barrières et distor-
sions causées par les institutions et politiques économiques, et qui peuvent affecter l’accumulation
du capital (regulations, corruption, droits de monopole,...) . Ces barrières peuvent cependant expli-
quer une grande partie de la disparité observée au niveau des taux d’investissements comme l’ont
souligné Restuccia and Urrutia [2001], et les prédictions du modèle quant à la dispersion des taux
d’investissement peuvent être améliorées en modélisant ces barrières.
Dans le dernier chapitre, j’ai analysé empiriquement un aspect de l’interdépendance dans la
prolifération des accords commerciaux régionaux. J’ai montré que la perte potentielle des marchés
à l’exportation peut inciter les pays exclus de ces accords à rechercher l’adhésion ou à créer de
nouveaux accords. Comme dans la plupart des analyses dans la littérature, l’attention est portée ici
sur l’effet des accords préférentiels sur les volumes de commerce. Mais les accords commerciaux
préférentiels n’affectent pas que les volumes de commerce des pays exclus : ils affectent aussi leurs
termes de l’échange (Mundell [1964]). Ces effets ont été mis en évidence par Winters and Chang
[2000] dans le cas de l’accession de l’Espagne à l’Union Européenne (Communauté économique
européenne à l’époque) et Gupta and Schiff [1997] dans le cas de l’impact du Pacte Andin sur
l’Argentine. Une analyse complémentaire consisterait à examiner dans quelle mesure ces effets
sur les termes de l’échange peuvent expliquer la prolifération des accords que nous observons.
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Annexe I
Annexes au chapitre 1
I.1 Data
I.1.1 Regional Agreements
The list of regional trade agreements that we use in the regression analysis of Section 1.2, by
type, and their country composition, is as follows:
– Economic Unions. Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo D.R., and Equatorial Guinea), Euro zone (Austria, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain), and West African Economic and Monetary Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-
Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).
– Common Markets. In addition to all Economic unions: East African Community (Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda), and European Economic Area (comprising the European Free Trade
Area of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, plus all the countries in the EU25).
– Customs Unions. In addition to all Common Markets: Andean Community (Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), Caribbean Community (Antigua and Barbuda, Ba-
hamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and To-
bago), Eurasian Economic Community (Belarus, Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajik-
istan), EU25-Turkey (all the countries in the EU25 plus Turkey), Gulf Cooperation Council
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), Southern Com-
mon Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and South African Customs Union
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland).
I.1.2 Countries
The full sample of 136 countries that we use in the regression analysis of Section 1.2 includes:
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bel-
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gium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo D.R., Congo Rep.,
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
I.2 Decentralization
We decentralize the planner’s allocation as a competitive equilibrium with tax subsidies on sav-
ing. Our decentralization scheme is an adaptation of Wright [2006]. 1 Within the union, countries
trade a complete set of Arrow securities. In the world market, they trade freely on a riskless one-
period bond. A central government authority in the union implements a tax and transfer scheme,
designed to support the constrained-efficient allocation, and thus prevent default in the appropriate
states.
For each country i = 1,2 in the union, let ai(y¯′;bi, b¯, y¯) denote the net stock of the Arrow
security that pays in state y¯′ tomorrow, conditional on individual wealth bi and the aggregate state
(b¯, y¯), with price q(y¯′; b¯, y¯). Let b′i(bi, b¯, y¯) denote the net stock of foreign bonds that earn interest
r tomorrow.
1. Wright [2006] uses taxes on borrowing instead of saving subsidies, although the two are equivalent. Wright
[2006] also studies an alternative decentralization based upon country-specific borrowing limits, along the lines of
Alvarez and Jermann [2001].
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Let also τ(b¯, y¯) denote the subsidy rate on net asset purchases, and Ti(bi, b¯, y¯) the lump-sum
income tax faced by country i.
In a competitive equilibrium with capital controls, country i solves the following problem for
every current state
Vi(bi, b¯, y¯) = max
ci,b′i,{ai(y¯′)}
{
u(ci)+β ∑¯
y′
pi
(
y¯′|y¯)Vi (b′i, b¯, y¯′)
}
subject to
ci+
(
1− τ (b¯, y¯))(b′i+∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
ai
(
y¯′
))
= bi+Ti
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
(I.2.1)
and to a perceived law of motion for aggregate foreign asset holding b¯.
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget for each country separately, that is
τ
(
b¯, y¯
)(
b′i
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
+∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
ai
(
y¯′;bi, b¯, y¯
))
= Ti
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
(I.2.2)
for every current state and for each i.
A competitive equilibrium with tax subsidies is defined in the standard way, as (i) optimal de-
cision rules that solve each country’s problem given prices, government policy, and a perceived
law of motion for aggregate wealth; (ii) a government policy that satisfies the balanced budget
constraints given prices and individual decisions; (iii) Arrow security prices that clear asset mar-
kets; and (iv) consistency between the perceived law of motion for aggregate asset holding and the
individual decision rules.
Our goal here is to show that there exists a government tax and transfer policy that supports
the constrained-efficient allocation as a competitive equilibrium. We focus on the key steps of the
argument.
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Consider the first-order conditions to the country’s problem
1− τ (b¯, y¯) = (1+ r)∑
y′
pi
(
y¯′|y¯) βu′ (ci(b′i, b¯′, y¯′))
u′
(
ci(bi, b¯, y¯)
) (I.2.3)
(
1− τ (b¯, y¯))q(y¯′; b¯, y¯) = pi (y¯′|y¯) βu′ (ci (b′i, b¯′, y¯′))
u′
(
ci
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)) . (I.2.4)
Given isoelastic preferences, the last equation implies
ci
(
b′i, b¯′, y¯′
)
ci
(
bi, b¯, y¯
) = c(b¯′, y¯′)
c
(
b¯, y¯
) for i= 1,2. (I.2.5)
The two Euler equations imply
1 = (1+ r)∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
. (I.2.6)
Note also that, at the optimum, we may use (I.2.2) to eliminate subsidies and transfers from
(I.2.1):
ci
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
+b′i
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
+∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
ai
(
y¯′;bi, b¯, y¯
)
= bi. (I.2.7)
Consider now the constrained-efficient allocation, the solution to problem (P1′). This alloca-
tion, which we denote with a star superscript, satisfies the planner’s Euler equation
u′
(
c∗
(
b¯, y¯
))−φ∗ (b¯, y¯)= β (1+ r)∑¯
y′
pi(y¯′|y¯)u′ (c∗ (b¯′, y¯′)) . (I.2.8)
Using (I.2.5) in (I.2.3), and requiring that the resulting allocation be consistent with (I.2.8),
it is easy to compute the state-contingent subsidy rates that implement the constrained-optimal
allocation as
τ
(
b¯, y¯
)
=
φ∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
u′
(
c∗
(
b¯, y¯
)) . (I.2.9)
Note that if the borrowing constraint to problem (P1′) does not bind in state
(
b¯, y¯
)
, then
φ∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
= 0 and so τ
(
b¯, y¯
)
= 0. In this case, from (I.2.4) and (I.2.6), the domestic interest rate
equals the world interest rate. If the constraint is instead binding, then the (post-subsidy) domestic
interest rate is higher than the world interest rate. This ensures that countries save in a constrained-
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optimal way, and that equilibrium borrowing is self-enforcing.
It is relatively straightforward to show formally that, given a constrained-efficient allocation
that solves (P1′) and (P2) for the appropriate set of welfare weights, one can obtain individual
asset holdings from (I.2.7) together with the market clearing condition for Arrow securities, Arrow
security prices from (I.2.4), and a government policy from (I.2.9) and (I.2.2) that support that
allocation as a competitive equilibrium with tax subsidies.
To find the appropriate set of welfare weights, we use the method proposed by Negishi [1960].
This method exploits the equivalence between the market and the constrained-efficient allocations.
We obtain the time-0 present value budget constraint of country i by iterating forward on the
flow budget constraint (I.2.7). We express it as
Ci
(
bi0, b¯0, y¯0
)
= Yi
(
b¯0, y¯0
)
+(1+ r)bi0,
where Ci
(
bi0, b¯0, y¯0
)
and Yi
(
b¯0, y¯0
)
are the time-0 present-values of consumption and the endow-
ment, respectively. At time 0, the time of forming the union, y¯0 is the union’s endowment pair, bi0
is country i’s net stock of foreign bonds, and b¯0 = ∑i bi0 is the union’s aggregate asset.
It follows from (1.4.4) that we may express the present value of individual consumption as
fraction of the present value of aggregate (constrained-efficient) consumption, that isCi
(
bi, b¯, y¯
)
=
αiC∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
. Replacing above allows us to recover the individual consumption share parameters as
αi =
(1+ r)bi0+Yi
(
b¯0, y¯0
)
C∗
(
b¯, y¯
) . (I.2.10)
Given equilibrium Arrow security prices q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
, and optimal decision rules c∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
and
b∗′
(
b¯, y¯
)
, the C∗ and Y functions solve the following functional equations
Yi
(
b¯, y¯
)
= yi+∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
Yi
(
b¯′, y¯′
)
(I.2.11)
C∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
= c∗
(
b¯, y¯
)
+∑¯
y′
q
(
y¯′; b¯, y¯
)
C∗
(
b¯′, y¯′
)
(I.2.12)
with
b¯′ = b∗′
(
b¯, y¯
)
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Notice that although it is straightforward to obtain the welfare weights from the consumption
share parameters, we only need to know the αi’s in order to uncover the individual allocations.
I.3 Numerical algorithms
I.3.1 World economy equilibrium
Our algorithm can be described in the following steps:
1. Solve for the autarky value function Vaut(y) from equation (1.3.6).
2. Given a current guess for the equilibrium interest rate r, solve problem (P0) by iterating on
the following steps:
(a) Consider the nth iteration, with a current conjecture for the debt limit bWn . For the initial
conjecture, we use the natural borrowing constraint.
(b) Given bWn , solve problem (P0) by policy function iteration. We discretize the state-
space and use cubic-spline interpolation to compute decisions outside the grid.
i. First find the decision rules that solve the system of first-order conditions to prob-
lem (P0), ignoring the debt limit. Consider the jth iteration, with a current con-
jecture for the consumption decision rule c jn(b,y). Compute a candidate update
c j+1n (b,y) by solving
u′
(
c j+1n (b,y)
)
= β (1+ r)∑
y′
pi(y′|y)u′ (c jn(b′,y′))
with
b′ = y+(1+ r)b− c j+1n (b,y).
As part of the solution, we obtain b′ j+1n (b,y).
ii. Check whether the borrowing constraint is violated. If b′ j+1n (b,y) < bWn , then up-
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date the solution as follows:
b′ j+1n (b,y) = b
W
n
c j+1n (b,y) = b−b′ j+1n (b,y)
φ j+1n (b,y) = u
′ (c j+1n (b,y))−β (1+ r)∑
y′
pi(y′|y)u′ (c j+1n (b′,y′)) ,
If instead b′ j+1n (b,y) ≥ bWn , then update using the unconstrained solution, setting
also φ j+1n (b,y) = 0.
iii. Iterate on the previous two steps until the decision rules converge. At the end,
compute the value function Vn(b,y).
(c) Given Vn(b,y), update the debt limit as follows:
bWn+1 = max
y′
{
by′ :Vn(by′,y
′) =Vaut(y′)
}
.
(d) Iterate on steps 2b and 2c until the borrowing limits converge.
3. Check the market clearing condition by approximating the aggregate bond holding in the
world economy with the total bond holding of a particular country over a very long simu-
lation period. We discretize the state-space using a finer grid, and linearly interpolate the
decision rules.
4. Iterate on steps 2 and 3 until we find an interest rate that approximately clears the bond
market.
I.3.2 Union problem under centralized default
Our algorithm to solve for the union’s allocation given an equilibrium world interest rate r can
be described as follows:
1. Solve problem (P1′) using the method described in step 2 of the algorithm of Section I.3.1.
As part of the solution we obtain the union decision rule c∗(b¯, y¯), the multiplier function
φ∗(b¯, y¯), and the value function VU(b¯, y¯).
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2. Decentralize the union’s constrained-efficient allocation as a competitive equilibrium with
capital controls.
(a) Compute tax-subsidies from (I.2.9).
(b) Compute pre-subsidy Arrow-security prices from (I.2.4).
(c) Compute the present-value functions from (I.2.11) and (I.2.12). In practice, we guess
some arbitrary functions on a grid and then iterate on the two recursive equations until
convergence. We linearly interpolate these functions when future wealth levels fall
outside the grid.
(d) Compute consumption shares from (I.2.10).
(e) Compute the value function for each country from (1.4.6).
Annexe II
Annexe au chapitre 2
II.1 Data appendix
II.1.1 Net foreign asset positions
The list of countries includes: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burk-
ina Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Rep., Chad, Chile, China,P.R.: Mainland, China,P.R.:Macao, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Dem.
Rep. of, Congo, Republic of, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Esto-
nia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, The, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Dem.Rep, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Rep. Bol.,
Vietnam, Republic of Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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II.2 The computation algorithm
We solve the recursive model defined by equations 2.3.8 and 2.3.9 using three layers of itera-
tions with stopping criteria respectively to εc = 10−6, εb = 10−5 and εr = 10−2. The iterations are
as follows:
– At the lower level, we take the interest rate and the debt limit as given and iterate on Euler
equations to find decision rules for consumption cn+1(.), capital kn+1(.) and bond holding
bn+1(.). The algorithm exits this level if two successive iterations give decision rules that
are close, that is ‖cn+1(.)− cn(.)‖ ≤ εc.
– At the second level, we take the world interest rate as given and iterate on debt limit Bn(.)
until ‖Bn+1(.)−Bn(.)‖ ≤ εb;
– At the first level, we iterate on r until the market for bonds clears. That is: ‖Erb′‖ ≤ εr.
We now present in more details the steps involved:
Step 1: Solve the model of financial autarky and calculate the value function V aut(.).
Step 2: Conjecture an upper and a lower bound for the equilibrium interest rate and pick r∈ [rl,rh].
Step 3: Conjecture an initial debt limit B0(.) =−D where D is high enough so that the constraint
never binds in equilibrium.
Step 4: Let’s assume that we arrive after the nth iteration with an endogenously determined debt
limit Bn(.). 1
Step 5: Solve the model for equilibrium functions V n(.), cn(.), kn(.) and bn(.) by iteration on
Euler equations. It is as follow:
1. Guess initial decision rules c0(.), k0(.), b0(.).
2. Again, let’s assume that after j iterations we arrive at decision rules c j(.), k j(.) and
b j(.). For each state (b,k,s):
– Assume that the borrowing constraint is not binding and use a nonlinear root finder
1. Note that the borrowing limit Bn(.) determined after each iteration is a concave function of the state variable k.
Therefore, the problem is well defined at each iteration.
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to solve the following set of equations for (c,k′,b′):
[θ +ψ2(k,k′)]u′ (c) = βEs
[(
rk′−ψ1(k′,k′j)
)
u′(c′j)−µ ′j
∂B′n
∂k′
]
(II.2.1)
u′ (c) = β (1+ r)Es
[
u′(c′j)−µ ′j
∂B′n
∂b′
]
(II.2.2)
c+θk′+b′+ψ(k,k′) = ω
where rk′ ≡ αz′k′α−1+(1−δ )k′.
– Check wether b′ < Bn(b,k,s). If so, set b′ = Bn(b,k,s) and use equation II.2.1to
solve for k′. Else, decision rules c j+1,k j+1,b j+1 are found.
3. Iterate on step 2 until ||c j(.)−c j+1(.)|| ≤ εc. In this case, decision rules associated with
the borrowing limit Bn(.) are found. We set cn(.), kn(.) and bn(.) to the final solution
and compute V n(.) simply by iteration as follows:
V n(b,k,s) = u(cn)+βEsV n(b′,k′,s′)
where k′ = kn(b,k,s) and b′ = bn(b,k,s).
Step 6: Once V n(.) is computed, update the debt limit as follow. For each state (b,k,s) the new
debt limit Bn+1(ω,k,s) is the number bˆ′ such that:
bˆ′ = max
s′:pi(s′|s)>0
{
bs′ :V
n (ω ′,k′,s′)=V aut (k′,s′)}
with k′ = kn(b,k,s) and b′ = bn(b,k,s).
Step 7: Check wether ||Bn+1(.)−Bn(.)|| ≤ εb. If it is the case, the endogenous debt limit is found
and the second loop of the algorithm is exited. Else, one has to return to step 2.
Step 8: Check whether the market for bond clears. We first generate a series of length T =
100,000 for the productivity shock. Then, from an arbitrary initial condition, we iterate
forward on decision rules to compute a series of length T for asset. We drop the first 1000
observations in order to abstract from the effect of the arbitrary initial condition and approxi-
mate the excess demand on asset market Erb′ by taking the arithmetic mean of the remaining
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sequence of bond decision.
Step 9: We check wether |Erb′| ≤ εr. If it is so, equilibrium interest rate is found and the algorithm
stops. Else, if Erb′ < 0 we set rmin = r. Otherwise, rmax = r. We pick a new interest rate in
[rmin,rmax] and returns to step 4. We typically set r = (rmin+ rmax)/2.
The model is solved using Lahey-Fujitsu Fortran 95. Nonlinear equations are solved using
the IMSL routines DNEQNF and DZBREN. The grid for capital and asset positions contain 50
points each, spaced in such a way that there are more points near low level of capital and also the
borrowing limit area. We evaluate decision rules for point outside the grid for capital and asset
using quadratic interpolation (DQD2VAL).
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II.3 Figures
(a) NFA/GDP (b) Investment rate
Figure II.1: Evolution of the 80 percent range of NFA positions and investment rates, 1970-2007
(a) NFA/GDP (b) Investment rate
Figure II.2: Evolution of the standard deviation, 1970-2007
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(a) NFA positions (Coeff. correlation = 0.37)
(b) Investment rates (Coeff. correlation = 0.86)
Figure II.3: Persistence of NFA positions and investment rates
